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It is the purpose of this thesis to examine the capital 
structure of the nonferrous metals, coal, and iron sectors 
of the American mining industry and to comment upon the role 
played by depletion funds in providing capital for expansion 
and improvement. The capital structure of the industry is 
that mixture of debt and equity which provides long-term 
funds to the industry.
The major sources of long-term funds are bonds, common 
stock, preferred stock, leases, retained earnings, deprecia­
tion and amortization, and depletion. Bonds and leases 
represent debt funds, while common and preferred stock, 
retained earnings, depreciation and amortization, and deple­
tion represent equity, or ownership, funds.
In general, debt financing should be used only when 
future earnings are assured so as to reduce risk to both 
borrower and lender. The cost of capital is somewhat 
dependent upon, and will determine in part, the mixture of 
debt and equity used in a capital structure. Ratio analysis 
is a useful tool with which to examine the capital struc­
ture of a company or industry and is used in this thesis.
The capital structure of three sectors of the American 
mining industry is examined by tracing the following ratios 







0 ̂ common stock and surplus 
total capitalization
Internally generated funds have become relatively more 
important since 1900 and have always been significantly more 
important than have external funds. Depreciation and deple­
tion funds were 19 percent higher than retained earnings 
between 1900 and the mid-1950,s. Use of debt financing has 
increased significantly since 1900.
A survey of the capital structures of 14 mining and 4 
petroleum companies between 1929 and 1968 showed that the 
importance of debt financing has fluctuated greatly, but 
that its importance has increased in both sectors over time. 
The petroleum industry used more debt financing than did 
mining until the mid-1960fs when mining began using debt in 
amounts comparable to the petroleum industry. The use of 
preferred stock financing has declined significantly in 
importance since 1929 in the mining industry. The petroleum 
industry has never used more than negligible amounts of 
preferred stock. The proportion of common stock and surplus 
has declined in both mining and petroleum with the increased 
use of debt.
The originally planned depletion study was made
iv
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impossible by the inadequacy of published data. Only 
three companies of the 18 surveyed provided adequate data. 
This information indicated that possibly as much as 30 to 
40 percent of the mining industry’s total funds may be 
provided by depletion allowances.
New trends in mine finance are found in debt use and 
in government participation in mining ventures. The ABC 
transaction and carved-out production payments will become 
important financing methods in the future. Government 
participation, especially in underdeveloped countries, may 
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It is the purpose of this thesis to examine the capital 
structure of the American mining industry and to comment upon 
the role played by depletion allowance funds in providing 
capital for expansion and improvement.
The American capitalistic system is essentially a 
system of incentive, reward, punishment, and efficiency. 
Capitalism allows the free flow of productive resources - 
land, labor and capital - to those sectors of the economy 
where they may be used most efficiently. The mechanism 
which makes this flow possible is in the market place. 
Although modern industry in the United States is by no means 
so simple and smooth-running as Adam Smith*s market place, 
the new industrial state, as seen by Galbraith, preserves 
much of the substance of the economic system as seen by 
Smith.
One example of the efficiency of our system is in the 
financial structure of our industry - the structure which 
provides the funds necessary for the system to operate. If 
capital structure is defined as the mixture of all sources 
of long-term capital used by the corporation (Bonneville, 
1959, P« 161), we find that different segments of American 
industry have developed structures which best suit the type
1
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of business in which they are engaged. For the purpose of 
this thesis, the sources of capital which make up this 
structure are bonds, common stock, preferred stock, retained 
earnings, capital surplus, depreciation, and depletion. 
Several other minor sources may also be included. Generally, 
bank loans are not considered long-term and, therefore, will 
not be considered as part of the capital structure.
Industries differ in structure and in financial needs 
and may require different mixtures of debt and equity. For 
instance, the public utility industry has very large(invest­
ments in long-term, fixed assets such as generating equip­
ment and furnaces. The industry also has a very stable, 
long-term earnings outlook due to Its localized monopoly 
position. Such characteristics allow, and require, the 
industry to use tremendous quantities of debt. Most seg­
ments of American industry - whether engaged in mining, 
retailing, or manufacturing - have characteristics which 
dictate certain proportions of debt and equity, long-term 
and short-term financing, and internal or external financing. 
In fact, most industries can be identified by their charac-
f
teristic capital structures.
The first purpose of this thesis is to examine three 
major segments of the American mining industry and to 
determine the characteristic capital structure of these 
segments. It has been necessary to limit the scope of this 
thesis to those companies having a net worth exceeding
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$1,000,000, as defined by Dunn and Bradstreet. Small 
companies, which contribute little to the gross mining 
output, have been omitted. The study has been limited to 
iron, coal, and nonferrous metal mining for the period 
1929 through 1968. A brief comparison of these three min­
ing sectors with the petroleum industry has been made for 
contrast.
The second purpose of this thesis is to examine deple­
tion and its role in mine finance. Recently, depletion 
practices have been attacked for providing the natural 
resource industries with unfair tax treatment. Since deple­
tion tax allowances are a large source of internal funds, 
depletion opponents argue that these funds provide the 
natural resource industries with low-cost, undeserved financ­
ing. Proponents of depletion point out that ore and oil are 
wasting assets and that funds similar in concept to depre­
ciation should be provided to finance the replacement of 
these assets. Proponents also argue that the risk involved 
in mining requires extra incentives to attract capital to 
these industries. Lost in all of the emotional rhetoric 
is factual information detailing the actual role played by 
depletion funds. What proportion of new financing is com­
posed of depletion funds? Is depletion, as presently 
computed, a fair and logical method for recovery invested 
capital? A detailed study of the role of depletion in mine 
finance is impossible due to a lack of meaningful data.
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However, a small amount of Information provided by three 
companies included in the study gives some indication of 
the importance of depletion allowances.
To provide an historical perspective to the capital 
structure examination, the author has made a survey of past 
financing methods in the mining industry. Fairly reliable 
information dating back to 1900 shows a definite trend in 
the type of financing used and in the type of assets pro­
cured with these funds. In order to complete the picture 
of past and present, a review of several new concepts in 
mine finance has been made. These recent financial innova­
tions are not at all revolutionary, but represent the appli­
cation of proven methods to the specific needs of the mining 
industry.
All of the financial instruments commonly used in long­
term financing have been defined and described in the first 
three chapters of this thesis. These instruments include 
bonds, stock, retained earnings, depreciation, and depletion.
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SOURCES OF LONG-TERM, EXTERNAL FINANCING
The principal methods of obtaining long-term, external 
funds are bonds, common stock, preferred stock, and leasing 
arrangements. Although the expression ’’long-term” has no 
concrete definition, funds obtained for periods greater than 
seven to ten years are usually considered to be long-term.
The term ’’external” refers to funds raised in either private 
or public capital markets outside of the firm. Retained 
earnings and depletion and depreciation funds are thus pre­
cluded. Recent trends in long-term financing with respect 
to the mining industry will be examined in a later chapter.
Bonds
A bond represents a debt of the issuing company to the 
bondholder, a creditor of the company. The bond is a written 
promise to repay this indebtedness at some definite time in 
the future as well as to pay the bondholder a definite 
interest rate for the use of his money. Bonds are usually 
issued in denominations of $1000 and may be placed privately 
or sold publicly through investment bankers. A trustee is 
appointed to represent the bondholders’ interests.
Over the years, many different types of bonds have been 
developed to satisfy the needs of both borrowers and lenders. 
For both parties, other financial instruments may be used to
5
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raise funds or to provide an investment. The final type of 
financing used is a product of what the corporation is 
willing to concede and of what the market will bear.
The distinctive features of debt, as opposed to equity, 
are related to maturity, claim on income, claim on assets, 
and voice in management.
In recent years, more than four-fifths of new bond 
issues have had maturities of 20 years or more, with a con­
centration in the 20- to 30-year range (Johnson, 1966, 
p. 488). In contrast to the definite maturities of bonds, 
stock financing is permanent and never need be repaid.
One of the disadvantages of debt financing is that 
periodic interest payments and payment of principal must be 
made regardless of the state of the business. If bond­
holders are to be assured a return of their principal, a 
sinking fund may be required into which the corporation must 
make periodic payments for retirement of the debt. The 
corporation may make these payments with its own bonds which 
it has purchased in the open market. If cash payment is 
made, the bonds may be purchased in the open market or may 
be called in for redemption. A sinking fund provision may 
take many forms. Whatever the variation, the purpose of the 
sinking fund is to insure that the debt is retired orderly 
and safely. The same purpose is served by the serial bond, 
a bond issue which has several series, each of a different
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maturity. Each series is retired according to a schedule, 
with the selling price of each series adjusted to the matur­
ity .
Prom the standpoint of the bond issuer, it may be 
beneficial if the bond issue could be retired at will rather 
than by a forced schedule. The bond issuer may insist upon 
a call provision which will enable the company to call bonds 
in for redemption before maturity - these are callable bonds.
The bondholder’s claim on the company’s income precedes 
that of the company’s owners - the stockholders. All 
interest payments and sinking fund provisions must be met 
before any income is distributed as dividends. The bond­
holders may even insist on other restrictive covenants which 
limit dividend distribution or further acquisition of assets. 
If the fixed payments to the bondholders are not met, the 
trustee may declare a default and force immediate payment of 
the principal or seize the assets which secure the bonds.
This fixed claim on income may be avoided'with income bonds 
which require interest payment only if it is earned. 
Frequently, a company will issue guaranteed bonds where a 
second company, perhaps the parent of a subsidiary company 
issuing the bonds, will guarantee both principal and inter­
est to increase the safety of the bonds.
The bond interest rate is the result of a bargaining 
process in which the company attempts to satisfy investors’
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demands to insure the sale of the issue, A lower interest 
rate may be possible if the issue is "sweetened" with terms 
favorable to the investor. Likewise, if the interest rate 
is increased, the investor may be willing to lengthen the 
bond maturity or to grant a more lenient call privilege.
One method of ’’sweetening" the issue is to offer a convertible 
bond, one which may be exchanged in the future for a given 
number of common or preferred shares. Many convertible 
bonds come with a call provision which enables a company to 
force conversion should this be desirable. Some companies 
issue convertible bonds with a call provision so as to force 
conversion to obtain low-cost, permanent equity financing 
through a bond issue.
Warrants, which allow the bondholder to purchase common 
shares from the company at a specified price, are sometimes 
used to ’’sweeten" an issue. Should the market price of the 
stock rise above the warrant price, the bondholder would 
benefit by purchasing the "warrant shares" and selling them 
on the market for a capital gain.
Should liquidation occur the bondholders always have a 
claim on assets prior to that of the owners. To insure 
themselves of less risk, bondholders may insist that 
specific assets be pledged as security for the bonds. Such 
bond issues are called mortgage bonds if the assets pledged 
are land or buildings. If equipment, such as railcars,
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engines, and machinery, is pledged, the bonds are called 
equipment trust certificates. Several secured bond arrange­
ments are possible; a complete explanation is beyond the 
scope of this paper. In each case, should liquidation occur, 
the assets pledged as security will be sold to satisfy the 
claims of the secured bondholders before any other creditors 
are paid.
Should the company have adequate earnings, a good 
financial history, good management, and a favorable outlook, 
it may be possible to sell unsecured bonds or debentures.
Such bonds have become very popular in recent years, 
especially for large companies. The bonds are secured only 
,by the earning potential of the company and, should liquida­
tion occur, the bondholders would have claim to the: ,
■company’s assets equal to that of all other creditors.
One of the most important financial developments of 
this century has been the subordinated debenture (oral 
communication, Dr. Henry Kester, 1969). The holder of a 
subordinated debenture accepts a claim on assets junior to 
that of most other creditors. By "freeing” assets for 
senior claims, subordinate debentures enable a company to 
borrow more heavily than would be possible if the bonds had
a claim on assets equal to that of other creditors. In this
sense, subordinated debentures are similar to preferred
stock. The advantage of this type of bond is that the
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Interest payments are tax deductible. If subordinated 
Income bonds could be sold, the company would nearly have 
preferred stock financing with tax-deductible 11dividends .
One advantage of debt financing is that the bondholders 
have no voice in management other than the conditions set. 
out in the indenture. This arrangement allows a company to 
raise and to use funds without diluting the control of the 
owners.
Bond financing is fairly low-cost compared with equity 
financing, since the interest charges are tax deductible.
To meet the fixed costs of bond issues, however, a company 
must have stable, reliable future earnings. There is a 
limit to the debt which may be built upon the company?s 
equity. These restrictions have limited bond issues to 
fairly large companies in reasonably ’’safe” businesses. It 
has been only recently that mining companies have ventured 
into large amounts of bond financing, a trend to be examined 
later.
Common Stock
The residual ownership of an Incorporated business lies 
in its common stock. The stockholder is the owner of the 
business and, therefore, is susceptible to the rewards of 
success and to the losses of failure. Each stockholder is 
limited in liability for the companyfs debts to the money 
he has invested in the stock. The corporation charter, the
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document which establishes the company as a legal entity 
in the eyes of the state, sets forth the conditions, rights, 
and liabilities of the stockholders. The funds received 
from this equity financing are a part of the permanent 
capital of the corporation.
The selling of stock usually assumes the eventual dis­
tribution of part of the profits as dividends. A portion 
of the earnings will be retained in the business to provide 
internal financing for expansion and replacement. Stock­
holders have no right to profits until dividends are 
declared by the elected board of directors and until the 
preferred stockholders have received their dividends.
Should the corporation be forced to liquidate, the owners 
of common stock receive what remains after all creditors ’ 
(including bondholders) and preferred stockholders * claims 
are settled.
The performance of the corporation is of critical 
importance for future financing. The market values a cor­
poration’s stock by the company’s past performance, its 
management, its earnings per share, and its earnings out­
look, among other factors. A high price-to-earnings ratio 
is necessary if the company is to benefit fully from a new 
stock offering. Should the company decide to finance 
through a stock issue, it is important that the earnings 
per share not be lowered by the new shares outstanding.
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The new projects, financed by the stock sale, should 
increase earnings at least enough to maintain the same earn­
ings per share ratio as before the new issue.
Financing with a sale of stock has several advantages.
There are no fixed charges or payment of principal to be 
made in the future, although most corporations attempt to 
pay some dividends on a regular basis. The funds received 
are permanently locked in the business. Stock issues also 
place few restrictions on management except insofar as 
stockholders are able to influence company policy through 
their voting rights. However, the sale of stock can dilute
control of a corporation and can dilute earnings per share,
to the disadvantage of the old stockholders. Equity 
financing is by no means.cheap. In addition to the mechan­
ical costs involved in issuing stock - such as legal fees, 
registration fees, printing costs, investment banker com­
mission, which may cost 2 to 5 percent of the total issue - 
there is a cost to the corporation for the use of the stock­
holders T money. Although authorities differ in the calcula­
tion of this cost, one method is the following (Hunt and 
others, 1966, p. 425).’
cost(after tax)~^ e a t i n g s  per share without stock issue)
(net price obtainable per share on the new issue)
This calculation assumes that earnings per share will not be
diluted by the new issue. This cost is very real to the
corporation, since stockholders do expect dividends and since
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the market usually penalizes those companies which do not 
adopt a reasonable program of dividend payment. Dividends 
are not tax deductible and represent a drain on after-tax 
revenues which can be very serious.
Preferred Stock
Preferred stock is a hybrid security having character­
istics of both bonded debt and common stock. The preferred 
stockholder maintains an equity position in the business 
with certain preferred privileges. He has all of the rights 
of the common stockholder with the exception of voting. 
Preferred stock is usually sold with a par value of $100 per 
share and carries a fixed interest rate with regard to 
dividends. The stockholder is by no means assured of 
receiving this dividend, however. He occupies a preferred 
dividend position, since these fixed dividends must be paid 
before dividends may be distributed to common stockholders. 
Preferred stockholders hold a senior asset position in the 
event of liquidation of the business. After all creditor 
claims, including those of bondholders, have been met, the 
remaining assets go first to satisfy preferred stockholders1 
claims. The remaining assets are then distributed to the 
common stockholders - the residual owners.
The preferred stockholder occupies a safer position 
than does the common stockholder, but he sacrifices poten­
tial high returns for this safety. He is limited to receiving
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a fixed return on his investment - the interest rate 
described previously - and usually cannot share in any 
dividends in excess of this amount. There are two types of 
preferred stock with respect to dividends - non-participating 
and participating. Nonparticipating stock is limited to the 
fixed interest dividend and may receive no more. Participat­
ing preferred will receive the fixed dividends before common 
and will also share, or participate, in dividends distributed 
to common stockholders. This arrangement is fairly rare 
today.
Preferred stock may also be cumulative or noncumulative. 
Cumulative preferred is stock whose stipulated dividend, if 
not paid in full in one or more years, is carried over and 
accumulated from year to year. This dividend in arrears 
must be paid in full before any common dividends may be 
paid. Preferred dividends in arrears have a very depressing 
effect on the market price of the common stock. Therefore, 
the board of directors usually considers cumulative pre­
ferred dividends to be a fixed and necessary expenditure 
each year. Noncumulative preferred has no such provision, 
and dividends not paid in any one year are lost forever to 
the stockholder. Preferred stock usually has no voting 
privileges; however, there may be provision for voting 
privileges if dividends have not been paid for a certain 
number of years.
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Preferred stock may also have a call provision similar 
to that of bonds, where the company can call preferred 
shares in at a given price so as to retire the issue. Some 
preferred issues have sinking fund provisions with a 
definite retirement schedule so that the company may retire 
the issue. This retirement provision allows the company to 
use nonpermanent equity financing without the fixed interest 
charges of debt. Preferred stock may be convertible into 
common shares to enable preferred shareholders to participate 
in higher dividends and voting rights. A call-converslon 
combination may allow the company the benefits of forced 
conversion.
Preferred dividends are not tax deductible and there­
fore represent a drain on after-tax revenues. Since it is 
a hybrid security, preferred stock can be more of a headache 
than a benefit to management. The stock has preference to 
dividends as does bond interest, but the dividends are not 
tax deductible. With cumulative preferred the dividends 
must be met and, therefore, are more like a fixed interest 
charge. It usually is better for a company to not have 
preferred issues, but, rather, to deal only in ’'straight'1 
debt or equity financing. As with common stock, there is a 
definite cost of preferred financing in addition to the 
mechanical costs of issue. Authorities differ as to the 
calculation of this cost, but one method used is the follow­
ing (Parwell and others, 1966, p. 417)*
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fixed dividends to stockholders .cost of preferred = ---------------------------------net proceeds per share to issuer
A lease is a contractual agreement whereby the owner 
of certain property (the lessor) allows another party (the 
lessee) to use the property for a certain length of time 
(Johnson, 1966, p. 523). The lessee incurs fixed obliga­
tions to the lessor resulting from the borrowing of an asset 
other than cash. The basic purpose behind all financing is 
to acquire the use of assets to increase a companyfs earn­
ing power. Usually, it is not absolutely necessary to have 
title to the asset so long as the company may use that 
asset. Thus, leasing is almost equivalent to bond financing 
in that fixed assets are acquired for use.
Assets may be leased for periods ranging from several 
hours to 50 years or more. Almost any type of asset may be 
leased - land and buildings, truck fleets, machinery, etc. 
The major lessors are commercial banks, insurance companies, 
and special private companies established for leasing. 
Long-term leases are usually for periods of at least 75 
percent of the useful life of the asset, and the leasing 
terms are designed to enable the lessor to recover his 
investment plus a profit within the lease period. The 
parties may enter into a sale-leaseback agreement, where 
the lessee sells an asset such as a building to the lessor 
and then leases it back. Hundreds of variations are
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possible with leasing arrangements - one of the main advan­
tages of this type of financing.
Many reasons are put forth in favor of lease financing. 
However, many of the usual arguments are not valid - a close 
examination of each case is necessary to determine the 
desirability of leasing. Equipment may be leased to protect 
the lessee from the risk of obsolescence; however, this risk 
also accrues to the lessor and thus is implicitly included 
in the lease charges. A great deal of flexibility is pos­
sible in lease agreements. Initial terms may be fitted to 
each case; but once the lease is signed, the terms are fixed, 
and the lessor is bound to them as though he owned the asset. 
Leasing may free badly needed cash from being tied up in 
fixed assets, but this is true only if the assets would 
otherwise have been financed from internal sources. Whether 
leasing is cheaper than borrowing depends entirely upon the 
individual case. Generally, leasing is more expensive than 
borrowing, but a detailed discounted cash-flow analysis 
would be necessary in each instance to determine this factor. 
Lease payments are tax deductible. This may be an advantage, 
especially since leased land may be "depreciated" through 
leasing while, otherwise, it would not be depreciable. The 
institution of accelerated depreciation in 195^ greatly 
reduced this advantage of leasing. It may be possible to 
raise more external funds when assets are leased, rather 
than when a large debt structure has been built to finance
T 1287 18
assets. However, since 
ing, this "hidden debt" 
will see the lease as a 
accordingly.
leasing is nearly the same as borrow- 
may afford no advantage. Investors 
long-term debt obligation and react
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SOURCES OF LONG-TERM, INTERNAL FINANCING
Although external financing instruments receive much 
publicity as suppliers of corporate funds, the major source 
of long-term funds is from within the business itself. In 
the post-WW II period, internal funds have provided 60 
percent of all corporate funds and 75 percent of all long­
term corporate funds (Farwell and others, 1966, p. 256).
The major sources of these funds are retained earnings, 
depreciation, and depletion. The first two categories will 
be examined in this chapter, while depletion will be examined 
in the following chapter.
Retained Earnings
After all expenses have been deducted from gross income, 
a net income is usually realized. This profit must then be 
divided into funds to be distributed as dividends to stock­
holders and into funds to be re-invested in the corporation - 
the retained earnings or earned surplus. In the past 20 
years, the average payout ratio, or proportion of dividends 
to net income, has fluctuated between 50 and 65 percent 
(Farwell and others, 1966, p. 258).
For an economy to gain maximum economic efficiency, 
funds should be directed toward the most profitable use. 
Shareholders should be allowed to decide for themselves the 
most profitable use of the returns on their investment. If
19
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shareholders are able to Invest company earnings more 
profitably than Is the company, the stockholders should be 
able to withdraw all funds which may be re-invested. Should 
this withdrawal of funds injure the company, or eventually 
kill it, economic justice will be done, because the company 
was less profitable than other sectors of the economy and 
therefore deserved to be "weeded out." Dividends should be 
withdrawn from company earnings to the.point where the last 
dollar withdrawn can be invested as profitably outside the 
company as within. Although this marginal approach cannot 
be completely satisfied in our economy, the system does 
function somewhat in this manner.
The board of directors is empowered by the stockholders 
to declare dividends. Generally, dividends must have some 
relationship to earnings. A company cannot pay dividends 
for long when it is losing money. On the other hand, 
future financing needs will require favorable market accept­
ance of the company *s stock.. A high market price will 
require the sale of fewer shares to raise a given amount of 
money. Often, market price is related to a company1s 
dividend policy. Dividends also depend upon a companyfs 
liquidity position, since most dividends are paid in cash. 
Legal factors or restrictive covenants of senior debt may 
limit dividends. After considering these and other factors, 
the board of directors will make the division between 
dividends and retained earnings.
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Those funds retained in the business will be used to 
finance new investments. Since retained earnings are per­
manent, equity financing, they should be used to finance 
long-term, and possibly risky, investments. Retained earn­
ings are free of external controls and require no bargain­
ing or concession in the market as do external funds. For• 
these reasons, retained earnings have been used extensively 
in American industry for expansion and replacement.
Many corporations incorrectly regard retained earnings 
as being cost-free. If earnings were distributed as 
dividends, they might be invested more profitably elsewhere. 
Therefore, there is an opportunity cost to the companyTs 
owners, the stockholders. Since dividends are taxed as 
income, the stockholder could not invest the entire dividend; 
the company can therefore justify retaining earnings for. 
investments of somewhat lower return than the investor might 
realize from alternate investments. This opportunity cost 
may be calculated as follows (Hunt and others, 1966, p. 429)
(Weston and Brigham, 1968, p. 283);
 ̂  ̂ j . (1-investors tax rate)(earnings per share)cost of retained earnings = — ------------------   ~ --- 2— ----------■market price of stock
The tax rate used must approximate the average investorTs rate, 
which is variously taken as 20 percent (Hunt and others, 1966, 
p. 429) or 40 percent (Weston and Brigham, 1968, p. 283). The 
cost of retained earnings is not an easy or even an explicit 
cost to calculate, but some estimate must be used. Generally,
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the cost of retained earnings lies above that of bonds and 
below that of common or preferred stock.
Earned surplus, or retained earnings, must not be con­
fused with other "surpluses’* listed on the balance sheet, 
some of which may be only "paper profits” and not actually 
a source of funds. Retained earnings may not indicate 
exactly how much money is available for reinvestment, since 
profits depend upon the calculation of expenses. Different 
methods of calculating inventory costs, depreciation, and 
other cost factors may yield entirely different profit 
figures,
Depreciation and Amortization
A second very important internal source of funds is 
depreciation of tangible assets and amortization of intan­
gible assets. Depreciation is a periodic charge against 
income for the use of the fixed, tangible assets which con­
tribute to the production of income. Capital assets are 
purchased and paid for at a fixed point in time, but the 
cost of the asset must be prorated over its productive life. 
Such assets include buildings, machinery, vehicles, and 
similar deteriorating assets, but do not include personal 
property or land. Amortization is similar in concept, but 
is a term usually applied to the recovery of the cost of 
intangible assets such as patents, trademarks, incorporation 
expenses, and other nonphysical asset costs. No cash out­
flow is incurred at the time of the depreciation or
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amortization charge against income. Although no cash out­
flow occurs, the expense may be deducted from income for tax 
computations. At this point, depreciation and amortization 
charges become internal sources of funds. Had this non-cash 
expense not been written off against income, taxes would 
have taken 48 percent (assuming the company is in the top •
48 percent bracket) of that amount. Through depreciation,
48 percent of the depreciation cost has been shielded from 
taxation. This amount, combined with the other untaxed 52 
percent forms a source of funds for the company.
Depreciation is centered on the idea that fixed assets 
deteriorate through wear and tear, action of the elements, 
and through obsolescense and inadequacy. This "using up" 
of assets should be charged as a production expense. There 
are two major approaches to depreciation from this point.
One school holds that depreciation should compensate a 
business for only actual costs incurred in buying the 
original asset. No provision is made for replacing the 
asset. The other major approach holds that depreciation 
should provide for the replacement of a worn-out asset.
With this approach, today’s methods of calculating depre­
ciation are not sufficient. Due to inflation, an asset 
purchased 10 years ago would cost less than the same asset 
today. Depreciation charges recovered using today’s methods 
of computation would not be sufficient to replace the asset.
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To partially rectify the inflation-replacement problem, 
four major depreciation methods have been developed. Two 
of the methods, straight line and units of production, are 
"unaccelerated" methods, since they provide for a uniform 
depreciation charge per unit of time or per unit of produc­
tion over the life of the asset. These methods provide for 
the recovery of only the original purchase price of the 
asset. The other two methods, the double declining balance 
and sum-of-the-years digits, are "accelerated" depreciation 
methods, which enable a much faster recovery of the asset’s 
purchase price early in the life of the asset than do the 
unaccelerated methods. Increasing the depreciation charges 
early in the asset’s life generates larger internal funds, 
which may be invested to earn a return that will provide 
for inflated replacement costs of the original asset.
Nearly all companies now use accelerated depreciation 
methods for tax purposes, although they may use other 
methods for their own purposes.
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DEPLETION FUNDS AS A SOURCE OF INTERNAL FINANCING
The sources of funds examined thus far have been common 
to all industries. Depletion funds, however, are unique to 
the natural resource sector - the petroleum and natural gas, 
mining, and timber industries. The natural resources 
exploited by these industries are depletable since, as time 
passes, the industryfs main asset is ’’used up,f and is not 
renewable in the same sense as is a machine or a building. 
This type of asset is sometimes called a wasting asset, 
since a fixed property investment is converted to stock in 
trade in the course of production. This chapter will 
examine depletion thoroughly from a conceptual, historical, 
mechanical, and financial standpoint.
Depletion as a Concept
Depletion is somewhat like depreciation, since the 
owner of an asset is allowed to recover his investment tax- 
free. The owner of an ore body or an oil field has incurred 
costs in obtaining that asset, much the same as the owner of 
a machine has incurred a purchase cost. Depletion deduc­
tions allow the owner of a natural resource asset to write 
off the cost of the asset against income earned so as to 
recover his investment in the asset. In recovering these 
funds tax-free, provision is made for the replacement of the
25
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ore body through further exploration or other means. The 
present depletion system also provides incentive to the 
mining industry and to sources of outside capital which 
otherwise might consider the industry too risky an invest­
ment, From this point, however, one's interpretation of 
"costs incurred" is critical in refining the definition or 
concept of depletion. This problem of interpretation has 
caused the heated political and economic debate over per­
centage depletion since its inception in 1926,
One school of thought, which supports the cost deple­
tion concept, argues that depletion should exactly parallel 
depreciation. The cost of the natural resource asset is 
the investment in exploration and development expenses, land 
purchases, and all other costs incurred in putting a par­
ticular property into production. This cost should be 
written off against income earned by the asset over the 
life of the ore body or oil field, the limit of the deduc­
tions being the original cost of discovery. One supporter 
of this cost depletion approach is Dean Erwin W. Griswold 
of the Harvard Law School, Using this "cost depletion" 
approach, should a company be fortunate enough to stumble 
upon a billion-dollar ore body after having incurred only 
$1000 in discovery expenses, the depletion base would be 
$1000, This concept is vigorously attacked by industry 
spokesmen who contend that cost depletion does not take 
account of the special problems and risks which occur in
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the mineral industries.
The second approach to depletion is that of discovery 
value depletion which, in 1926, evolved into the present 
percentage depletion method. This school of thought is 
supported by the industry and by many political and economic 
analysts who see the mineral industry as having special 
problems not common to any other industry. The same con­
cept is attacked by others who see percentage depletion as 
a tax loophole and as preferential treatment. Under per­
centage depletion, the owner of an ore body or oil field is 
permitted to write off against income a certain percentage 
of the gross revenues of the property. This deduction may 
be taken over the entire life of the property, there being 
almost no limit to the total deductions taken. The funds 
"recovered” through percentage depletion may exceed the 
original cost of discovery and development. The separation 
of the cost of asset from the total deduction possible has 
been the focus of most of the criticism of percentage 
depletion.
Discovery value and percentage depletion are defended 
on three basic grounds. First, the industry is entitled to 
recover, tax-free, the capital invested in wasting assets. 
All other industries may recover such invested capital 
through depreciation. The owner of a natural resource asset 
will invest this recovered capital in further exploration 
and development so as to replace his depleting asset.
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Unlike the owner of a "normal” asset, however, which 
may be replaced by a simple and certain purchase, the 
natural-resource owner has no assurance that he may replace 
his asset at a cost equal to that of his depleting asset. 
Had he been fortunate enough to discover his original ore 
body with little expense, he would have no certainty of 
finding another comparable ore body for an equally small 
expense. He might have to spend considerably more in the 
future to find a second deposit. Here, then, is the second 
justification for being able to recover more than the 
original cost of the asset - the owner must be reimbursed 
sufficiently so that he will be able to finance future 
exploration which may be more expensive than past ventures. 
Closely related to this uncertain future co3t is the 
matter of risk and its influence on attracting capital to 
natural-resource industries. Since future exploration is 
risky, incentive is necessary to attract funds into this 
sector of the economy. Investors who expose their funds to 
such uncertain ventures as finding an ore body must be 
given additional incentive and compensation should the 
venture be successful. Percentage depletion, by allowing 
larger tax deductions to mine and oil investors, maintains 
the flow of capital into these industries. Since mining 
and petroleum products are so important to the health of 
the American economy, such incentives should be considered 
a matter of national security. Rather than rely on foreign
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supplies, domestic exploration and exploitation must be 
encouraged.
Supporters of percentage depletion also point out that 
the mining and petroleum industries pay taxes to which other 
industries are not subject. Severance tax is such a tax. 
According to a 1963 study (Herlong, 1968, p. 148), the oil 
industry paid 5 percent of its gross revenues in taxes, a 
portion identical to that paid in taxes by all industry.
Opponents of percentage depletion hold that such pre­
ferential tax treatment provides a loophole and gives mining 
and oil an unfair advantage. Many such persons favor a 
complete abolition of depletion allowances; others support 
a reduction in the present rates. It is beyond the scope 
of this paper to attempt to answer either argument. It is 
significant that, usually, neither side supports its argu­
ments with quantitative evidence. The industry endlessly 
repeats its "risk" argument without providing proof. Like­
wise, supporters of lower depletion rates apparently pick 
these rates at random and offer little justification for 
their choice.
There is little question about how the framers of early 
percentage depletion legislation viewed the issue. Per­
centage depletion allowances were designed not only to 
recover capital, but also to provide incentive and higher 
rewards to natural resource Investors. World War I had 
impressed Congress with the need for mineral and petroleum
T 1287 30
products. Congress was anxious to insure future domestic 
supplies of these products for national security reasons. 
Furthermore, a panic had occurred after the war, when it 
appeared that our natural resources were nearly depleted. 
Incentive for further discovery of resources was the logical 
solution to the depletion problem. Government geologists 
in 1918 warned that the country had oil reserves to last 
only until 1939. The final report of the Senate Finance 
Committee in 1918 recommended "special provision.,.for 
increased depletion allowance...to stimulate prospecting 
and exploration" (Lichtblau, 1959, p. 33). Senator Penrose 
of Pennsylvania, speaking before the Senate on behalf of the 
Finance Committee, left no doubt that "the Committee delib­
erately intended to provide a liberal depletion policy for 
the purpose of stimulating the development of new resources 
such as mines, oil, or gas wells" (57 Congressional Record 
5^9, 65th Congress, Third Session). Subsequent congres­
sional and presidential examinations supported this policy, 
perhaps the strongest support being given in 1952 by the 
Paley Commission report.
The Supreme Court clearly supported the cost-depletion 
concept, although it never ruled against the percentage 
depletion procedure. Court decisions in 1917, 1927, and 
19^0 make this stand very clear. In a 1927 case, Judge 
Brandeis gave the court!s opinion (Lichtblau, 1959, p. 52):
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The sale of oil results in the reduction of a 
capital asset which must be considered in com­
puting taxable income just as the cost of raw 
material must be deducted from gross income 
before the net income can be determined.
Actually, both cost and percentage depletion concepts
are used today in computing the depletion deduction,
although the percentage depletion allowance is used most
frequently. The following short historical account of
depletion legislation will provide additional perspective
to this complex subject.
Historical Aspects of Depletion
Income tax collection in the United States began with 
the Corporation Exise Tax Act of 1909. This act provided 
for a tax of 1 percent on incomes over $5000, provided for 
a "reasonable” deduction for depreciation of capital equip­
ment, but had no depletion provisions. It was soon real­
ized that mine and oil field owners were being discriminated 
against. Treasury Decision 1606, in 1910, alluded to a 
5 percent depletion deduction, but in very unclear terms. 
There Is no evidence to suggest that the 5 percent deduction 
was anything but an arbitrary figure. The Revenue Act of 
1913 first encoded the concept of depletion and, in doing 
so, used much of the language of TD 1606. The mining and 
petroleum industries were allowed to deduct up to 5 percent 
of the gross value of output each year as a depletion allow­
ance. The limit of the total deduction over the years was
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the cost of the property or the market value on March 1, 
1913, whichever was greater. The 5 percent deduction again 
was arbitrary. Within three years, mining and oil interests 
claimed that the 5 percent limit was too low and was 
inequitable. Accordingly, the Revenue Act of 1916 pro­
vided for a ’’reasonable" depletion allowance each year, 
the total deduction over the years not to exceed the orig­
inal cost or the market value on March 1, 1913. The 5 
percent limit was removed. For mines, the yearly deduction 
was not to exceed the market value of the product in the 
ground which had been mined and sold during the year of the 
computation. The 1913 and 1916 Acts used the cost depletion 
approach which limited deductions to the cost of the asset. 
The March 1, 1913 market value clause was included to insure 
constitutionality of the law in view of an 1895 Supreme 
Court ruling. The acts were confusing, since they required 
use of contradictory theories of economic value.
The Revenue Act of 1918 was designed to eliminate this 
confusion and to provide incentive for further exploration. 
World War I had demonstrated to Congress the importance of 
domestic resources. The result of this realization was the 
concept of discovery value depletion deductions. The Act 
provided for the deduction of a "reasonable" allowance for 
depletion, the limit of the deduction over the years to be 
the market value of the property on the date of discovery
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or within 30 days thereafter. Properties discovered before 
1913 could use the March 1, 1913 market value. The cost- 
depletion clause was also continued as an alternative. The 
significance of the 1918 Act, however, was that the 
depletable base was the market value at the time of dis­
covery. Congress definitely designed the Act to stimulate 
exploration through liberal tax deductions. By 1921, it 
was apparent that some taxpayers were using these liberal 
deductions to off-set taxable income from business unrelated 
to mining and petroleum. The Revenue Act of 1921 limited 
depletion deductions to the net taxable income of the prop­
erty for which the deductions were taken. The Revenue Act 
of 192^ limited deductions in any one year to 50 percent of 
taxable income from a property before the depletion deduc­
tion.
By 1925, it was apparent that the discovery value 
method of computing depletion deductions was unworkable. 
Property valuation had to be made with only the most pre­
liminary exploration information. The difficulty of assess­
ing the economic value of a mineral property within 30 days 
of discovery need not be dwelled upon. The procedure made 
taxation inequitable, since valuation depended upon sub­
jective judgment. Naturally, the company geologist and the 
federal tax assessor never agreed upon the value of a prop­
erty. The problem was solved with the Revenue Act of 1926
T 1287 34
which established the present form of percentage depletion. 
Oil and gas operators could deduct 27% percent of gross 
income each year from taxable income. A yearfs deduction 
was limited to 50 percent of net taxable income before 
depletion. Mineral commodities other than oil and gas 
remained on the discovery value system. A survey of con­
gressional testimony surrounding this important Act reveals 
little reason for choosing 27% percent. The Senate passed 
a 30 percent deduction after hearing pleas for 25, 30, 32, 
and 43 percent. The House passed a 25 percent deduction.
The resulting 27% percent was a compromise. The only tan­
gible figure coming from the testimony resulted when the 
president of the Mid-Continent Oil Producers Association 
stated that "25 percent of gross income was the lowest pos­
sible rate that the oil industry could operate under without 
destroying its capital base" (Lichtblau, 1959, p. 40). 
Congressional literature clearly indicates that the intent 
v/as to approximate the deductions allowed the industry 
between 1918 and 1926 (Lentz, 1961, p. 522). Since every­
one agreed that the 1913 system was unworkable and many 
times produced tax dodging, there seems to be little logic 
in this approach. It appears that the controversial 27% 
percent oil depletion allowance was, to a great extent, an 
arbitrary choice. Congress also indicated that the purpose 
of the allowance was to recover capital, to provide incen­
tive, to assure mineral supplies for national security, and
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to attract capital to the mineral industries.
The new system worked very well, since it was simple to 
compute and required only concrete income figures. In 19 32, 
percentage depletion was extended to coal, metal mines, and 
sulfur. The same 1932 law attempted to define the term 
"mining,’1 since the point at which gross mining revenues are 
computed is critical. This concept of "mining" will be 
discussed later. In 19 39, further legislation was necessary 
to refine the definition of the term. In 19^3, other non- 
raetallics were added to the percentage depletion category; 
graphite, talc, mica, beryl, and potash, among other miner­
als, were covered. A further definition of "mining" was 
attempted. In 1951, rock products such as sand, gravel, 
stone, shale, brick and tile clay, marble, asbestos, borax, 
quartzite, and other products were given percentage deple­
tion allowances. During and after 195^ the term "mining" 
was further delineated, since the addition of rock products 
such as crushed gravel, caused many court disputes. The 
latest depletion legislation, and perhaps the most signifi­
cant since 1926, occurred in December 1969, when the per­
centage rates for selected products were reduced. Most 
notably, the oil and gas allowance was reduced from 21h to 
22 percent. Since there is evidence that the initial per­
centage figures were arbitrary, it seems likely that 
opponents of percentage depletion will concentrate on lower­
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ing present rates to equally arbitrary rates so as to close 
supposed tax loopholes. Exhibit 1 shows those depletion 
rates which were in effect in February 1970,
Throughout its stormy legislative history, percentage 
depletion has been attacked for providing tax loopholes 
and for giving the mineral industries special treatment,
The logic behind permitting a natural resource owner to 
recover his investment tax-free is overwhelmingly in favor 
of having some form of depletion allowance. However, since 
the intent of Congress was to allow for recovery of capital 
and to stimulate exploration, the case for permitting the 
full deduction to royalty owners is difficult to defend.
Much of the present protest involves such royalty cases, 
which can provide genuine loopholes to non-producers. The 
exact form of the depletion allowance is a debatable sub­
ject. The present percentages appear to be arbitrary. It 
would be advantageous to do a thorough study so as to pro­
vide a sound basis on which to build a depletion policy.
The petroleum industry has the additional burden of defend­
ing tax provisions which allow it to write off, as expenses, 
all intangible drilling and development costs while still 
being eligible for percentage depletion. It appears that 
such costs should be capitalized and used to compute the 
cost depletion base, since the intent of Congress was to 
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through depletion deductions. The present system allows a 
double deduction for these expenses.
Computation of the Allowance
The actual computation of the depletion allowance is a 
complex process involving a great deal of technical account­
ing and financial work. This paper will deal only briefly 
with the mechanics of the computation. Exhibit 2 details 
the process. All discussion will involve the mining deple­
tion allowance, since the computations for petroleum and gas 
are markedly different. The first step in computing the 
allowance is to delineate the property, defined by the 
Internal Revenue Code as "each separate interest owned by 
the taxpayer in each mineral deposit in each separate tract 
or lease" (Robie and others, 1964, p. 479). The question 
of property and aggregation of properties is a complex legal 
affair and is beyond the scope of this paper. Once the 
property is defined, the gross revenues from the mining 
operation must be determined. Since tax lav; permits 
depletion allowance only on mining revenue, it is important 
to define the point at which mining ends and manufacturing 
begins. Mining includes not only extraction from the 
ground, but also the "ordinary treatment processes normally 
applied by mine-owners or operators in order to obtain the 
commercially marketable product" (Robie and others, 1964, 





1969 gross revenues 
1969 royalty payments 
1969 total costs 
depletion rate 
reserves Jan, 1, 1969 
1969 production 
adjusted cost base, 
Jan, 1, 1969
A, Percentage depletion and 50# limit
1) gross revenue
2) less royalties
3) adjusted gross revenues 
less total costs
4) net income before tax 
and depletion
5) percentage depletion 
allowance (15# of $900,000)
6) 50# net income limit::
B, Cost depletion calculation:
1) adjusted cost base from 
Jan. 1, 1969
2) unit cost 1969 ($100,000 
divided by 200,000 tons)
3) tons mined in 1969
4) depletion sustained on
cost, 1969
C, Summary
1) percentage depletion allow­
ance
2) 50# net income limit























D. Allowable depletion deduction: $ 135*000
E. Taxable income calculation:
1) net income before tax and
depletion $ 300,000
2) less depletion allowance $ (135,000)
3) net taxable income $ 165,000
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where most of the gangue is removed in order to produce a 
concentrate. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) allows 
transportation of up to 50 miles from mine to mill. The 
law does not consider smelting or refining as part of 
"mining." The definition of mining with respect to many 
rock products is especially difficult, since the law dis­
tinguishes between crushing and grinding (mining processes) 
and pulverizing (manufacturing). Many court cases were 
fought in the 1950*s and early 1960's between rock producers 
and the IRS; the IRS lost most of the cases (Bell, 1959* 
p. 85).
Once gross revenues from mining have been determined 
and all royalties have been deducted, this figure is mul­
tiplied by the percentage allowable for the commodity in 
question. The resulting depletion deduction must be tested 
against two other depletion calculations. The net taxable 
income, before depletion deductions, is determined by sub­
tracting all costs incurred during the mining operation, 
including depreciation, from the adjusted gross income. The 
allowable depletion deduction is limited to 50 percent of 
this net income before depletion. A cost depletion figure 
must also be calculated by taking the capitalized cost of 
the property (including all purchase prices, capitalized 
exploration expenditures, etc.), adjusted for past deple­
tion deductions, and dividing this figure by the estimated 
reserves at the beginning of the tax period. This
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"depletion cost per ton" figure is then multiplied by the 
total production for the given tax period, resulting in the 
cost depletion for the period. Should the cost depletion 
allowance be greater than either the percentage deduction or 
the 50 percent limit, the cost depletion amount is used for 
the tax allowance. If the cost depletion allowance is the 
smallest amount, the percentage depletion allowance is used 
for the deduction, if it is smaller than 50 percent 
of net income. If the latter figure is smaller, then the 50 
percent limit is the allowable deduction.
The depletion allowance is deducted from net income to 
arrive at the net taxable income. At this point, depletion 
funds become a source of internal financing. Assuming that 
the company is large and is in the 48 percent tax bracket, 
roughly 48 percent of the depletion allowance is shielded 
from taxation and may be used to finance new ventures.
There are many complex calculations involved in arriv­
ing at the net income figure. In mining, exploration 
expenses up to $100,000 per year (to a limit of $400,000) 
may be deducted as expenses. Expenses over $100,000 per 
year (or $400,000 total) must be capitalized as part of the 
depletable base. A second alternative is available for 
exploration expenses, but is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Exploration costs incurred .on unsuccessful ventures may be 
written off as losses without limit as long as the failure 
of the venture can be proved. Development costs may be
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deducted against current income or may be capitalized and 
written off against future production on a per unit basis* 
Therefore, it is important to determine when exploration 
ends and development begins, since a company may benefit 
tremendously from being able to write off development 
expenses rather than to capitalize exploration costs. On 
the other hand, by writing off development or exploration 
expenses, the taxpayer reduces his 50 percent of net income 
depletion limit and may sacrifice some depletion benefits. 
Each case must be taken individually and few generalizations 
are possible. Related to the problem of reducing the 50 
percent limit is the handling of depreciation. Normally, it 
is beneficial for the taxpayer to use accelerated deprecia­
tion methods so as to quickly recover his investment. How­
ever, these accelerated methods may also reduce the 50 
percent limit. The actual process of computing the deple­
tion allowance is much more complex than is presented in 
this paper. However, the computation is primarily an 
accounting problem and will not be pursued further in this 
paper.
Other Possible Depletion Concepts
There are other tax concepts which allow for the deple­
tion of a natural resource should one object to the present 
arbitrary percentages. One of these will be presented 
briefly.
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G. S. Borden, a tax lawyer, suggested that, if one 
agrees that an ore body is a capital asset, it is not im- 
plausable to consider that the mining, and subsequent sale, 
of the ore body is merely the long-term sale of a capital 
asset in installments. As such, the profits derived from 
the sale (revenues less purchase, exploration, and operating 
costs) might be taxed by the low, long-term capital gains 
tax (Robie and others, 1964, p. 473). Such treatment would 
provide funds for further exploration, incentive, etc. 
Shortly before 1920, the Supreme Court, while not ruling 
specifically on this concept, implied that such treatment 
would be illegal. It is important to remember that the 
present method for computing the depletion allowance may not 
be the only way to allow for recovery of capital invested 
in depleting assets. Since tax legislation concerning 
depletion is a contemporary problem, it may be wise to con­
sider completely new concepts in tax legislation which can 
be defended on more solid grounds than can present deple­
tion practices.
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CAPITAL FORMATION - THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
All major financial instruments used today in American 
business have been examined and are now integrated into a 
study of how the mining industry has organized its finances.
In order to fully understand the present capital structure 
of the mining industry, an historical overview of its 
development will be helpful. Data have been assembled for 
the period 1900-1958 to trace this development. The back­
ground of mine finance will be compared with the financial 
development of the petroleum industry. A brief explanation 
of basic business finance principles will be given.
Basic Business Finance
Most major industries exhibit a characteristic mixture 
of internal, external, debt, and equity financing. This 
mixture is determined by many factors and is not adhered to 
by all companies in the sector. Two of the more important 
factors which determine the capital structure are risk, both 
to the company and to the investor, and the cost of capital.-^ 
The assumption of debt requires that fixed interest 
charges and principle be paid in future periods. A mining 
firm must be careful in assuming debt, since these fixed 
charges are incurred whether or not the company is successful. 
Therefore, only when earnings are relatively assured, when
46
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risk is low, should the firm assume debt.
The largest amount of debt financing in recent years 
has been through mortgages on fixed plant associated with 
producing mines. Mortgages may be used to finance smelters, 
mills, or development work. Once a mining project has 
reached an advanced stage, careful planning and evaluation 
will have reduced risks to levels comparable to those in any 
other industry. Obviously, the same low-risk conditions are 
not present during exploration when no such success is 
assured. Since the mining industry operates in relative 
uncertainty, one might expect a low ratio of debt to total 
capitalization.
A second important factor in the development of a 
capital structure is the cost of capital. As was shown in 
preceding chapters, each form of financing has its cost. 
Generally, stock issues are the most expensive form of cap­
ital. Retained earnings cost somewhat less, while debt 
financing frequently is the cheapest capital available other 
than depletion and depreciation funds.
The amount of debt which may be built upon an equity 
base has a definite limit. Creditors are not anxious to 
finance a major portion of a firm?s operations and to incur 
the major risks, while the owners reap the profits from a 
safe distance. The cost of debt will rise as the propor­
tion of debt to equity increases. The company should 
attempt to use cheap, borrowed funds insofar as prudence
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allows to gain favorable leverage and higher returns on 
equity. These factors will produce definite capital costs 
for the firm and will, in part, determine the mixture of 
debt, equity, internal, and external funds.
Given the above factors, one would expect the mining 
industry to use large amounts of debt to finance large 
projects in advanced stages of development. Large companies 
having income from many properties would especially qualify 
for debt financing, since earnings would not depend on only 
one project.
Although beyond the scope of this thesis, a basic 
relationship also exists between long- and short-term funds 
and the assets financed. Short-term funds should not be 
used to finance projects which return earnings only over the 
long term. The financing of assets should be commensurate 
with the assets1 ability to pay for that financing. A 
capital-intensive industry like mining would be expected to 
use a great deal of long-term capital.
Ratio Analysis
One of the most useful tools of business finance is 
ratio analysis. This technique is used by analysts to 
diagnose problems within a business and to compare a 
business or industry with other business sectors. Figures 
taken from a companyfs financial statements are combined 
into simple ratios for the analytical procedure. The 
ratios are only as meaningful as the figures which compose
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them. Different accounting procedures between firms or 
abnormal conditions, causing distorted statements, may 
produce misleading conclusions. All figures must be com­
parable. While these problems can be serious, ratio 
analysis may serve as a very valuable tool if properly 
applied.
This thesis examines the capital structure of three 




2) Preferred stock 
total capitalization
3) common stock and surplus 
total capitalization
These ratios show the importance of debt versus equity in
the capital structure of the industry. They do not show the
importance of internal versus external financing, since
depreciation, depletion, and retained earnings are not
treated separately. This deficiency will be overcome in the
following chapter.
Limitations of Study
This chapter examines the historical trends in mine 
finance between 1900 and 1958. Much of the data come from 
an exhaustive study done in the 1950*s by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) concerning the sources
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and uses of funds in the manufacturing and mining sectors 
(Creamer and others, i960). Supplementary data were 
gathered by the author from the financial statements of 
selected mining companies for the period 1929-1958.
The companies used in this analysis are meant to rep­
resent the nonferrous, metal mining industry; the coal 
industry; and the iron mining industry. The largest and 
most important producers in each sector were used where 
possible.
The nonferrous metal producers are well represented by 
nine companies whose financial statements are comparable 
throughout the period 1929-1958. Most of the major iron-ore 
producers are subsidiaries of large steel producers. The 
financial data of such subsidiaries are not available. Two 
independent companies, Cleveland Cliffs and Hanna, we re used 
to represent the independent iron-ore producers. The coal 
industry is represented by three large companies which pro­
duce a large portion of the nation*s coal. The three pro­
ducers were chosen for their size and for the continuity of 
their data.
The coal and iron sectors are represented by only a 
few companies. The lack of a large sample in these sectors 
produces some distorted data when large financial opera­
tions are undertaken by any one company. However, these 
sudden distortions are easily observed from the tables and 
graphs, which are used to present the data, thus enabling
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the reader to discount such large fluctuations as abnormal.
The four oil companies used in the study were chosen 
from a survey of 23 companies and were used because of their 
size and the continuity of their data. These four com­
panies adequately represent the industry as indicated by a 
survey by Studley Shupert Statistics, Inc. (1967). Three 
of the companies - Texaco, Gulf, and Standard (N.J.) - are 
among the five largest corporations in the United States.
The fourth, Continental Oil, is one of the best financially 
managed companies in the United States. To provide an 
insight into the relative sizes of the companies used in the 
study, Exhibit 3 shows the 1968 gross incomes of all 18 
companies. The oil companies vary from twice to 15 times 
the size of the largest mining company.
Trends in Capital Formation
Most of the data for this section came from the N3SR 
study (Creamer and others, i960) concerning capital in 
manufacturing and mining. The NBER raw data came from 
government sources such as the Census of Manufacturerss 
1880-1919; Statistics of IncomeA 1919-1953; Federal Reserve 
Board studies; and Internal Revenue Service studies.
Two main approaches may be taken in examining capital 
formation: to examine the structure of internal versus




Gross Revenues of Sample Companies 
(Moody's Industrial Manual, 1969)
Company 1968
American Smelting & Refining Co, $ 634,0 80,514
Anaconda Co. 1,051,015,000
Cerro Corp. 418,974,916
Homestake Mining Co. 25,740,000
Kennecott Copper Corp. 724,487,839
Phelps Dodge Corp. 550,421,794
U.S. Smelting & Refining Co. 129,040,485
American Metals Climax Inc. 570,594,277
Hecla Mining Co. 22,127,177
Peabody Coal Co. 233,923,000 (1966)
Island Creek Coal Co. 135,173,384 (1966)
Ayrshire Collieries Corp. 62,043,534
Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co. 84,708,821
Hanna Mining Co. 170,591,161
Continental Oil Co. 2,420,243,000
Gulf Oil Corporation 4,558,548,000
Standard Oil Co. (N.J.) 15,473,900,000
Texaco, Inc. 5,459,771,000
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Internal Versus External Financing: The relative import­
ance of internal and external financing is influenced by many 
factors. During periods of high profits, such as WW I, 1926 
to 1929, and WW II, business uses internal sources of funds. 
During low profit periods, such as the Depression, external 
funds assume more importance. Naturally, periods of low 
interest rates encourage external financing.
Between 1900 and 1953, internal funds were of much 
greater importance than were external in the mining and 
manufacturing industries. There was no clearcut relation­
ship between total long-term financing and plant and equip­
ment expenditures, but the relative importance of internal 
and external financing shifted appreciably. Between 1900 
,and 1953, gross internal funds became relatively more import­
ant. The ratio of internal funds to new security issues 
rose considerably. The ratio of long-term, external funds 
to new financing definitely decreased.
Retained Earnings: Retained earnings were roughly
twice as large as were total new security issues. Gross 
internal financing (retained earnings, depreciation, and 
depletion) was more than five times as large as new 
securities issued for the period. Since most long-term 
funds are used to increase long-term assets, it is helpful 
to compare asset growth with each type of long-term financing.
Retained earnings have fluctuated in importance consider­
ably since 1900. Between 1900 and 1919, the ratio of
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retained earnings to asset change increased from 41.3 percent 
to 52.5 percent. Between 1919 and 1929, the same ratio was 
very low (26.1 percent), indicating that retained earnings 
were less important. During the Depression (1929-1937), the 
ratio was negative due to corporate dissaving, as companies 
attempted to maintain dividends by reducing retained earnings. 
Prom 1937 to 1948, the ratio was at a new high (53.5 percent) 
as the war, tax policy, and good profits caused retained 
earnings to be used extensively for expansion. Between 1948 
and 1953, the ratio declined somewhat (to 49.2 percent), 
indicating less dependence on retained earnings.
During the same 1900 to 1953 period, the ratio of new 
security issues to asset change varied inversely with the 
retained earnings to asset change ratio. This relationship 
indicates that external sources of capital became more 
important as dependence on retained earnings decreased. The 
only period which did not exhibit this inverse relationship 
was 1948-1953, when a third finance source became important - 
income tax reserves, which may be considered as short-term 
capital lent by the government. Therefore, despite the 
abnormal period of 1929-1937, mining and manufacturing con­
cerns relied mainly on internal sources of capital for asset 
expansion.
The data also indicate that, during periods of moderate 
asset expansion, mining and manufacturing firms relied on 
internal funds, while, during periods of rapid expansion,
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external capital sources were tapped. This relationship is 
to be expected since huge mining projects, such as Tv/in 
Buttes or the expansion of El Teniente in Chile, require 
large amounts of capital in very short periods. Internal 
reserves, built up for normal replacement and expansion, 
are not sufficient for this sudden drain.
Depletion and Depreciation; The relationship between 
retained earnings, depreciation and depletion is most 
interesting. For all mining and manufacturing firms, 
depletion and depreciation funds were less than retained 
earnings in only three periods between 1900 and 1953. These 
three periods were 1900 to 1908, WW I, and 1946 to 1949. In 
all other periods, depletion and depreciation were more 
important sources of funds than were retained earnings. For 
the entire 53-year period, depletion and depreciation funds 
were 1,7 times as large as retained earnings. If the 
abnormal periods of dissaving, 1921 and 1932 - 1938, are 
omitted, depletion and depreciation funds still exceeded 
retained earnings by 19 percent. Between 1900 and 191*1, 
depreciation and depletion accounted for 48 percent of gross 
internal funds; between 1919 and 1929, 73 percent; between 
1936 and 1940, 89 percent; and between 1946 and 1953, 53 
percent. Most depreciation and depletion funds were used to 
replace, rather than to expand, assets.
In the post-WW II period, depletion has accounted for 
29 percent of total depletion and depreciation funds in
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mining. Depletion has accounted for roughly 15 percent of 
gross internal financing. Since internal sources comprise 
60 to 70 percent of total funds, depletion has contributed 
9 to 10h percent of total mining funds in recent years.
This subject will be considered more completely for the 
period 1958-1968 in the next chapter.
It is interesting to compare depletion and depreciation 
funds actually "received" and the actual property values 
which depreciated (the adjusted depreciation and depletion). 
For all years between 1900 and 1953 except 1932 to 1938, the 
amounts claimed by the mining and manufacturing sectors for 
depletion and depreciation were less than the adjusted 
depletion and depreciation figures. This fact indicates 
that not enough funds were being recovered through depletion 
and depreciation to cover replacement of the assets depre­
ciated. This statement must be clarified by pointing out 
that, prior to 1913, depreciation and depletion figures were 
not generally computed and, prior to 1932, percentage 
depletion was not used in mining. One might expect the 
depreciation and depletion costs recovered and those 
actually incurred to be more similar in recent years. Also, 
in 1954, accelerated depreciation was introduced for the 
first time which could enable an expanding company to per­
petually recover high amounts of depreciation.
Debt Versus dquity Financing:- Having examined internal 
versus external sources of funds, we may now examine debt
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versus equity financing. It must be remembered that the 
components of debt and equity are the same as those of 
external and internal funds. Retained earnings, deprecia­
tion, depletion, and stock issues comprise equity funds.
All long-term debt is external and is composed of bonds and 
bank loans. The term 1 total debt" includes short-term debt 
as expressed in current liabilities.
In general, mining and manufacturing firms have not 
relied heavily on long-term debt. However, debt use has 
expanded considerably since 1900, both in absolute dollar 
volume and in relation to total capital invested. For 
manufacturing firms, the total debt to total assets ratio 
has increased from 23 percent in 1923 to 36 percent in 1952. 
A similar increasing trend is seen in the mining sector. 
Large companies have used debt to a much greater extent than 
have small companies, especially in mining where small, one- 
property companies are generally bad credit risks and, 
therefore, cannot raise long-term debt capital. Use of 
short-term debt has increased from roughly 10 percent of 
total assets in 1914 to 20 percent of total assets in the 
post-WW II years. The largest short-term debt increase 
came from income tax accruals.
Reliable data concerning the use of debt In the mining 
sector are available between 1919 and 1953- The ratio of 
total debt to operating assets in the mining industry 
declined from 1919 to 1929. This ratio was 27.8 percent in
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1929, 34.1 percent in 1937, 39.2 percent in 1948, and 42,4 
percent in 1952. The pattern for manufacturing was very 
similar. The ratio of interest-bearing debt to operating 
assets was 19.6 percent in 1923, 20.4 percent in 1937, 19.7 
percent in 1948, and 22.6 percent in 1952. The ratio of 
total debt to total assets followed the same general trend, 
being 24.6 percent in 1929, 27.6 percent in 1937, 30.2 
percent in 19 48, and 34.1 percent in 1952. In all of the 
above ratios, assets are book value. Operating assets are 
those physical assets used to produce income.
Generally, the rising debt ratios were associated with 
expansion of , operating assets rather than with replacement. 
It should be recalled that depreciation and depletion 
accounted for most replacement expenditures. The use of 
debt for expansion is consistent with a general trend 
throughout industry to use debt increasingly to finance 
operating assets.
Bonds: The use of bonds as a debt instrument was very
important before the Depression in the mining industry.
For the 5-year period 1900-190*4, mining companies obtained 
approximately $36 million through bond issues. In the 4- 
year period 1924-1927, the industry obtained $42 million, 
The funds realized between the two periods fluctuated con­
siderably. Between 1927 and 1946, there was a net outflow 
of bond funds from the mining sector as mining companies 
attempted to retire bond issues. The hard times of the
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Depression made the fixed commitments of bond financing very 
risky. This reduction in the use of bonds in the mining 
industry will be shown clearly in the next section of this 
chapter. Since most of the debt to assets ratios showed a 
rise over this period, the form of debt must have changed 
from bonds to bank mortgages, short-term credit, and income 
tax accruals. The value of assets decreased through depre­
ciation.
During the 1920fs, the petroleum industry was the major 
issuer of bonds. Even during the 1930fs, the petroleum 
industry was one of the few industries to have a positive 
inflow of bonded debt financing. Petroleum industry 
financing prior to 1929 provides an interesting sidelight. 
Some oil companies, Cities Service for example, issued bonds 
and stock and invested the proceeds in the broker’s loan 
market in New York, thus fueling the eventual stock market 
disaster (Galbraith, 1954, p. 36).
Stock and bond financing in mining and manufacturing 
showed several changes between 1900 and 1953. From 1900 to 
1919, new bond issues per year decreased in dollar amount 
from being considerably larger than new stock issues to 
being considerably smaller. Between 1919 and 1946, the 
amounts of new stock and bond issues per year generally 
moved in the same direction, but bond issues were consider­
ably smaller in amount. Following WW II, both stock and 
bond issues rose a great deal, but bond issues exceeded
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stock issues by a considerable amount. Industry used more 
bonded debt than new equity issues, since the economic 
future looked promising and since the Treasury policy of 
maintaining low government bond yields kept the entire bond 
market very low. However, even though bond issues far 
exceeded new stock issues, the increased use of internal 
funds following WW II caused bonded debt to assume a slightly 
less important position in comparison to equity financing.
Summary: Between 1900 and 1953* internal funds were
much more important sources of financing than were external. 
Internal funds became relatively more important from 1900 to 
1953. Retained earnings were extremely important during 
periods of high profits, while external security issues were 
important during periods of low profits. Depreciation and 
depletion funds were larger in amount than were retained 
earnings for the 53-year period and were used mainly for 
asset replacement. Depletion accounted for approximately 
15 percent of gross internal funds in the post-WW II period.
The use of debt financing has increased since 1900, 
although firms have not relied heavily on this form of 
financing. Nearly all ratios which compare debt with assets 
rose during the period 1919-1953. Debt funds were used 
mainly for expansion rather than for replacement. The use 
of bonded debt increased markedly after WW II and exceeded 
new equity issues during this period.
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Capital Structure Trends in Mining and Petroleum, 1929-1958
The data shown on Graphs 1 to 3 and in portions of 
Tables 1 to 3 were assembled from Moody1s Industrial Manual 
for the years 1929 through 1958. It should be remembered 
that the capital structure of an Industry is that mixture 
of long-term debt and equity which provide the industry with 
its financing. The petroleum and mining industries are con­
trasted to point out the different capital structures 
developed by the two industries.
The limitations for using ratio analysis must be kept 
in mind. Comparable figures must be used throughout. This 
study is concerned only with trends: small distortions will
not affect the data significantly. The years chosen for 
the study were designed to be as "normal” as possible while 
still showing the total economic picture between 1929 and 
1958. Several Depression and World War II years were 
omitted.
Funded Debt - Nonferrous Metals Industry: The funded
debt to total capitalization ratio shows a marked difference 
among the three mining sectors and between the mining com­
posite and petroleum industry. Graph 1 and Table 1 show 
this difference. The nonferrous metal producers show a sharp 
decline in the use of funded debt from 1932-1933 until 1952. 
Six of the nine companies used some funded debt during the 
Depression, but only two, Anaconda and Phelps Dodge, used a 
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small amounts of long-term debt (less than 4 percent) or 
none at all.
The use of some long-term debt early in the Depression
was probably due to the very low interest rates common
during this period. Stock prices were extremely low, thus 
making it uneconomical to issue stock. Due to the hard 
economic times and to the uncertain future, no companies 
were willing to risk large amounts of debt. The use of debt 
decreased markedly and, by WW II, only Anaconda had funded 
debt in its capital structure. This downward trend is 
consistent with the observation in the previous section that, 
during the 1930*s, mining companies attempted to eliminate 
bond financing due to the risk of fixed debt payments. In 
1952, Amax, Anaconda, and Cerro began using moderate amounts 
of debt, the debt-to-capitalization ratio for the three 
being 14.7 percent, 8.8 percent, and 7.6 percent, respectively. 
Between 1952 and 1958, five of the nine companies used some 
debt financing. The ratios ranged from a low of 0.9 percent 
for Kennecott to a high of 28.5 percent for Homestake. Four 
companies used no debt in their capital structure at all.
The industry trend, shown in graph 1, was a low and declin­
ing ratio from 1932 to 1952, followed by a rise in the use
of debt from 1952 to 1958, The increasing use of debt 
reflected better economic times when the fixed costs of 
debt could be borne more safely.
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Funded Debt - Coal and Iron Industries: The debt
picture is not so clear for the coal industry which may 
reflect a diversity of financing methods within the industry 
itself. Peabody Coal shows a tremendous use of debt 
throughout the period. The funded debt to total capitaliza­
tion ratio was 33.3 percent in 1933, 51.0 percent in 19^5 
and 19^7, and 33.2 percent in 1953. The major debt instru­
ment was a large mortgage bond issue in the mid-19401 s. 
Island Creek used no debt at all except in 1938 and 1939. 
Ayrshire used an amount of debt midway between that of Pea­
body and Island Creek. The ratio was 3^.^ percent in 19^5 
(the first year of comparable data available) and 16,1 per­
cent in 1958. The major debt instruments for Ayrshire were 
secured bank loans throughout the period. A definite down­
trend in debt use occurred, although the ratios were 
significantly higher in coal than they were in nonferrous 
metals. The relatively greater use of debt in coal may 
reflect the use of long-term sales contracts to public 
utilities. Such contracts would assure coal companies of 
future earnings with which to meet debt obligations. The 
industry averages show a fairly stable ratio of around 16.0 
percent during the 19 30's; a rise to nearly 30.0 percent 
between 19^5 and 1950; and a decline to nearly 16,0 percent 
in 1958, a trend opposite to that in the nonferrous metals 
sector.
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The iron mining industry trend may not be representative, 
since only one company had adequate data over the entire 
period. Cleveland Cliffs had a debt-to-capitalization ratio 
of 26*7 percent in 1933. The ratio declined steadily to a 
low of 6.3 percent in 1950 and then rose to 12,2 percent in 
1958, a trend very comparable to that in the nonferrous 
metals industry. The relatively large use of debt may also 
reflect long-term sales contracts as in the coal industry.
The composite pattern for the mining industry is fairly 
clear, although the small number of coal and iron producers 
may not be entirely representative. The debt ratio in 
1932-1933 was relatively high (15.6 percent); the ratio then 
declined to a low ratio of 8.4 percent in 1950 and 1951. 
Beginning in 1952, the ratio rose to 14.7 percent in 1956 
before a decline to 9.8 percent in 1958. For the entire 26- 
year period, the average ratio was 13.1 percent.
Funded Debt - Petroleum Industry: The petroleum industry
stands in rather striking contrast to the mining industry in 
its use of funded debt. As shown on Graph 1 and in Table 1, 
the petroleum industry consistently used a high ratio of debt 
financing in its capital structure. The funded debt to total' 
capitalization ratio for the four petroleum companies ranged 
from a high of 23*3 percent in 1932 to a low of 12.5 percent 
in 1945. Although some sizeable ratio differences existed 
between the four companies in any one year, each company
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generally showed a higher ratio than did any mining company,
A pattern similar to that found in mining may be seen
1
in the oil industryfs use of debt over time. In the early 
Depression years, the ratio was 20,0 percent or above.
Between 1932 and 19^5* an irregular but definite decline in 
the ratio occurred to a low of 12,5 percent in 19^5. Beginning 
in 19^6, an irregular but definitely increasing ratio occurred 
until, in 1958, the ratio was 18.2 percent. The average ratio 
for the 30-year period was 16.6 percent.
The contrast between mining and petroleum is apparent.
The petroleum industry used large amounts of debt throughout 
the period, while the mining industry used much smaller 
amounts of debt until 1952, Even after 1952, the mining 
industry ratio was relatively small compared with that of 
petroleum. The contrast between the nonferrous metals 
industry and the petroleum industry is even more sharp in 
that almost no debt was used by mining companies in this 
sector until 1952.
Preferred Stock - Nonferrous Metals Industry: The con­
trast between petroleum and mining in the use of preferred 
stock is clear. This contrast may be seen on Graph 2 and in 
Table 2, which show the ratio of preferred stock to total 
capitalization for all companies in the survey. Extensive 
use of preferred stock v/as made by three nonferrous metals 
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other six companies in this sector had no preferred stock in 
their capital structures. Both American Smelting and U.S. 
Smelting obtained nearly 40.0 percent of their capitalization 
from preferred stock in 1933, while Amax obtained 12,6 per­
cent, The ratio of preferred stock to total capitalization 
decreased markedly, if somewhat erratically, for American 
Smelting and Amax between 1929 and 1958 but remained fairly 
constant for U.S. Smelting, The average ratio for the non- 
ferrous metals industry declined steadily during the period 
from over 10,0 percent in the 1930fs to 5.6 percent in 1958. 
This decline may have occurred in two ways. Since all pre­
ferred in the sector was callable, it may have been called 
and retired. The companies may also have ceased using 
preferred stock while increasing their use of other financing 
instruments, A minority of nonferrous metals producers used 
preferred stock. When such stock was used, however, it was 
used in large amounts. It occupied an increasingly less 
important position in the composite capital structure 
between 1929 and 1958,
Preferred Stock - Coal and Iron Industries: The coal
industry exhibited diversity in its use of preferred stock 
between 1929 and 1958. Peabody Coal used extensive amounts 
of preferred stock; its ratio of preferred to total capital­
ization was 36.9 percent in 1933, a high of 42.8 percent in 
1938, and only 3.6 percent in 1958. Island Creek used only
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negligible amounts of preferred stock. Ayrshire never used 
any preferred financing. Preferred stock was used very 
little in the coal industry between 1929 and 1958, but when
 it— did occupy a position in the capital structure of a
company, it was a large position. As shown by the coal 
industry average ratios, the importance of preferred stock 
declined significantly.
The iron-ore industry, represented only by Cleveland 
Cliffs, shows extensive past use of preferred financing.
From a low preferred stock to total capitalization ratio of 
27.7 percent in 1933, the ratio rose to 59.0 percent in 1948 
and then declined to 28.1 percent in 1958. Although little 
generalization can be made about the industry from one 
sample, the ratio of preferred to capitalization did decline 
toward 1958, a pattern similar to that in the other two 
mining sectors.
The mining industry composite ratios indicate a defin­
ite downward trend in the preferred stock to total capital­
ization ratio between 1929 and 1958 for the entire 14- 
company sample. This trend indicates the decreasing import­
ance of preferred stock in the capital structure of the 
industry over the period.
Preferred Stock - Petroleum Industry: The petroleum
industry exhibited a sharp contrast to the mining industry 
as shown on Graph 2 and Table 2. None of the companies used 
any preferred stock between 1929 and 1958. This absence of
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preferred is not entirely characteristic of the industry, as 
indicated in a Studley Shupert Statistics, Inc. industry 
survey (1967, *0 of 2 3 companies. The ratio varied from
  a period high of 4.7 percent in 1929 to a low of 0.5 percent
in 1958. These averages are still very low compared with 
those in mining. The petroleum industry used very little 
preferred stock between 1929 and 1958; the low ratio of 
preferred to capitalization declined markedly during this 
period.
The contrast between the petroleum and mining industries 
in the preferred stock sector is clear. Petroleum has 
historically used much less preferred financing than has 
mining. In both industries, the importance of preferred 
stock in the capital structure steadily declined between 
1929 and 1958. The reason for the marked difference 
between the two industries is a subject for speculation.
Due to the risks inherent in early mining activities, 
stockholders may have demanded a preferred position with 
regard to assets should liquidation have occurred. The 
early and spectacular oil boom may not have produced so many 
skeptical stockholders; instead, these stockholders may have 
preferred the rewards of common ownership to the relative 
safety of preferred stock.
Common Stock and Surplus - Nonferrous Metals Industry: 
Common stock, or residual, ownership reflected the changes 
in funded debt and preferred-stock financing. In this
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thesis, the terms flcommon stock" and "surplus" refer to the 
amounts shown on balance sheets as common stock par value, 
capital surplus, and retained earnings. Graph 3 and Table 3 
show the changes in the use of common stock and surplus for 
the 1929 to 1958 period.
Common stock and surplus accounted for 86.4 percent of 
the capitalization of the nonferrous metals industry in 1932- 
1933. This average ratio reflects the moderate use' of 
funded debt in the early Depression years and the heavy use 
of preferred financing by three companies. Prom 1932-1933> 
the proportion of common stock to total capitalization rose 
to a high of 91.8 percent in 1951> reflecting the decreased 
use of debt and the generally decreasing use of preferred. 
Times were uncertain during the 1930fs, thus requiring 
equity financing, and profitable enough during WW II to 
allow retained earnings to be used extensively.
Between 1952 and 1958, the ratio declined irregularly 
to 83.5 percent in 1955 and then rose to 87.4 percent in 
1958. This decline in the importance of common equity 
reflects the growing use of debt financing toward 1958 and 
the declining importance of preferred stock.
Common Stock and Surplus - Coal and Iron Industries:
The coal industry again exhibited diversity among the 
companies used, Peabody Coal had a very low common and 
surplus to total capitalization ratio due to its high pro­
portions of debt and preferred stock. From a low ratio of
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27 to 29 percent in the 1930*3, the Peabody ratio increased 
to 38.7 percent in 1947, reflecting a decrease in importance 
of preferred stock* A 1948 issue of preferred stock lowered 
the ratio to 17.3 percent in that year. After 1948, the 
ratio generally increased to 63.2 percent in 1958, reflect­
ing the declining importance of preferred stock. Island 
Creek had a ratio of nearly 100 percent for the entire 26- 
year period. Ayrshire showed a generally increasing, 
though irregular, ratio of common and surplus to total 
capitalization for the period. The ratio rose from 75.6 
percent in 1945 to 83.9 percent in 1958.
The coal industry average ratio showed a gradual rise 
in the proportion of common and surplus financing from 1932- 
1933 to 1958. This trend reflected the decrease in import­
ance of both preferred stock and funded debt.
The iron mining industry, represented by Cleveland 
Cliffs, exhibited an irregular rise in the common stock and 
surplus to total capitalization ratio. The ratio increased 
from 45.6 percent in 1932-1933 to 59.7 percent in 1958, thus 
reflecting lower dependence on preferred financing.
The mining industry composite ratio of common stock and 
surplus to total capitalization gradually increased from 
1929 to 1958, thus supporting the NBER study which showed 
increased use of retained earnings toward the 1950*s. The 
ratio was 65.6 percent in 1932-1933 and 83.2 percent in 
1958. The ratio reflected the declining importance of
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preferred financing and the increased use of debt.
Common Stock and Surplus - Petroleum Industry: fhe
petroleum industry common and surplus ratio is a direct 
reflection of the debt ratio, since no preferred stock was 
noted in the survey. The proportion of equity financing 
remained fairly constant throughout the period, although 
there was a gradual increase in the ratio from 1929 to 19^5 
(80 percent in 1929 and 87*5 percent in 19^5). The ratio 
then declined to 81,8 percent in 1958. It is quite evident 
that the petroleum industry maintained a fairly high, 
constant common and surplus ratio from 1929 to 1958 while 
the mining industry ratio climbed from a relatively low 
ratio in 1932-1933 (65.6 percent) to one comparable with 
that of petroleum (83.2 percent) in 1958.
Summary: The mining industry use of debt financing
definitely increased from 1929 to 1958. The rise in the 
use of debt began in 1952. The use of preferred stock 
declined during the 1929-1958 period. Common stock and 
surplus financing rose between 1929 and 1958, reflecting 
a greater dependence on internally generated funds.
The petroleum industry consistently used more debt in 
its capital structure than did the mining industry. The 
proportion of debt to total capitalization remained fairly 
constant from 1929 to 1958. Very little use of preferred 
stock was made in the industry.
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PRESENT CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND COMMENTS ON DEPLETION
The last chapter traced the development of the capital 
structure of the mining and petroleum industries from 1929 
to 1958. This chapter continues the development for the 
period 1959-1968. The previous chapter also provided in­
sights into the changing nature of long-term funds. One 
important source of funds - depletion allowances - will be 
examined briefly. The part played by depletion funds has 
received little quantitative attention in recent studies of 
the sources and uses of funds by the mining and petroleum 
industries. Such lack of attention is undoubtedly due to 
the lack of meaningful data, a problem encountered in this 
study also.
Capital Structure - 1959 to 1968
The same technique as that used in the previous chapter 
has been used to determine the modern capital structure of 
the mining and petroleum industries. The following ratios 
have been computed for the nonferrous metals, coal, iron, 
and petroleum sectors from data in Moody1s Industrial Manual» 
1959-1969 and in annual operating statements:
1) funded debt/total capitalization
2) preferred stock/total capitalization
3) common stock and surplus/total capitalization.
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It is well worth repeating the limitations of this type 
of ratio analysis. The ratios are only as meaningful as are 
the figures used in the computations. Therefore, all figures 
must be comparable. Due to a certain amount of incomparabil­
ity, the exact ratios obtained from the data must be viewed 
with caution. This study is concerned with the trend in the 
ratios,not with the exact figures. Since a small number of 
companies have been examined, sudden changes in the struc­
tures of any one of them may seriously distort the general 
trend for the group. Reference to both the composite graph 
data and to the individual data shown in the industry tables 
is important. The problem of distortions caused by an 
individual company is particularly troublesome in the iron- 
mining sector, where only two companies are represented. 
Despite these problems, a definite trend may be seen in the 
sources of funds in both the mining and petroleum industries.
Funded Debt - Nonferrous Metals Industry: The use of
funded debt has increased markedly in all three mining 
sectors since 1959. Reference to graph 4 and to table 1 
on page 63 will show this increasing trend. Five of the 
nonferrous metals producers used some debt financing through­
out the period. By 1968, only Hecla Mining Co., the 
smallest company used in the survey, did not rely on some 
long-term debt. Phelps Dodge and Kennecott used signifi­
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Cerro Corp., Homestake, and Amax used large amounts of debt 
throughout the 1960*s.
As pointed out in the previous chapter, the use of 
significant funded debt in the nonferrous metals sector 
began in 1952 and increased markedly until 1956, at which 
time a downtrend began. By 1958, the ratio of funded debt 
to total capitalization was about 7 percent. This down­
trend continued into the early 1960*3. In 1959> the ratio 
was 7-2 percent; it then decreased to a low of 5*2 percent 
in 1962. In 1963, the ratio began a definite upturn, ris­
ing from 7*8 percent in 1963 to 20.9 percent in 1968. The
ratio high of 20.9 percent in 1968 capped a 40-year upward 
trend which began in 1929 at 2.9 percent.
Funded Debt - Coal and Iron Industries: The same
increasing trend is seen in the coal sector, where data 
showed a rise in the funded debt to total capitalization 
ratio from 17.4 percent in 1959 to a high of 27*4 percent 
in 1966. Data after 1966 are not available for Peabody or 
Island Creek due to mergers in 1967•
In the previous chapter, it was shown that the ratio
for coal increased from 16.6 percent in 1933 to 29.8 per­
cent in 1947. From 1947* the ratio decreased irregularly 
to 16.4 percent in 1958. The downward trend continued 
through 1959 (17*4 percent) to 1962 (14.7 percent). 
Beginning in 1963* the ratio increased dramatically until,
T 1287 82
in 1966, 27.4 percent of the coal industryfs financing came 
from debt funding. Although the sudden rise in 1963 was 
caused by a large debt issue by Ayrshire, the overall upward 
trend is supported by greater debt use by all three companies. 
One may conclude from the ratios of the three sample com­
panies that 1963 saw the beginning of a definite increase in 
the use of long-term debt to levels higher than those for 
any other sector in this study. Once again, the effect of 
long-term sales contracts undoubtedly was very important.
The picture is not so clear for iron mining. This 
sector had a generally declining ratio of debt to total 
capitalization from 1933 to 1952. In 1952, a mortgage bond 
issue by Cleveland Cliffs caused a sharp rise in the ratio, 
followed by a long decline. The ratio decline continued 
until 1965 and represented a period during which the 1952 
issue was retired while no new debt was issued. In 1965* a 
similar large issue by Hanna Mining Co. caused a sudden 
increase in the ratio, followed by a decline as the debt 
was repaid. Since only two companies have been used in this 
survey, large, infrequent debt issues will cause this long­
term rising and falling pattern. It may be significant, 
however, that at no time since the early 1930*s has the 
ratio been as high as it was in 1933• This fact points to 
the conclusion that the iron mining industry has used less 
debt recently than it has in the past, although the industry
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does use occasional moderate amounts of debt financing.
The mining industry average, as shown on graph 4 and in
table 1 on page 63, indicates a continuation of the decline
in the debt to total capitalization ratio from the late 
1950*s into the early 1960*s. The ratio fell from 14.7 
percent in 1936 to 10.1 percent in 1959 and to 8.2 percent 
in 1961. In 1962, the ratio began a steady rise from 13.1 
percent in 1962 to 16.1 percent in 1968, indicating increased 
use of debt toward 1968. The debt ratio pattern since 1929 
has been somewhat irregular, but one can discern a long­
term decline in the ratio from 1929 to 1952, followed by an 
irregular but definite increase in the ratio from 1952 to 
1968.
Funded Debt - Petroleum Industry: The petroleum
industry data, shown on graph 4 and in table 1 on page 63, 
indicate a definite increase in the funded debt to total 
capitalization ratio from 1959 to 1968. Data presented in 
the previous chapter showed that, while the ratio fluctuated 
greatly during the 1929-1958 period, the petroleum industry 
used a fairly high amount of debt during the entire period. 
Beginning in 1959, the debt to total capitalization ratio 
rose steadily from 12.9 percent in 1959 to 20.8 in 1968. 
During most of the 1959-1968 period, the petroleum ratio 
was higher than that of mining, although the mining ratio
was higher between 1963 and 1966. Perhaps the most
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significant point to be made in comparing the mining and 
petroleum industries is that the mining industry, beginning 
in 1963> began to use debt to a degree comparable to that 
in the petroleum industry.
Preferred Stock - Mining Industry: The long-term
trends in the use of preferred stock continue to be very 
clear in both petroleum and in mining, as indicated on graph 
5 and in table 2 on page 69. In all sectors of mining, the 
use of preferred stock declined markedly between 1959 and 
1968. Although there were highly irregular fluctuations in 
the preferred stock to total capitalization ratio between 
1932 and 1958, the dominant trend in mining was toward a 
declining importance of preferred stock. The ratio for 
all mining sectors declined from 18,8 percent in 1932-1933 
to 7.0 percent in 1958. The same ratio declined from 6.8 
percent in 1959 to 3*2 percent in 1968. All three mining 
sector ratios declined markedly during this period. The 
only companies which had large amounts of preferred stock 
outstanding were U.S. Smelting and Cleveland Cliffs. Even 
in these two companies, the ratio declined markedly between 
1959 and 1968.
Preferred Stock - Petroleum Industry: The petroleum
industry continued to use only negligible amounts of pre­
ferred stock between 1959 and 1968. During the period 1929- 
1958, no preferred stock was used by any of the companies 
sampled. In 1963, Continental Oil had a small issue of
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preferred stock outstanding, but the preferred stock to 
total capitalization ratio never rose above 0.1 percent.
A definite conclusion may be drawn from this mining 
and petroleum data. The use of preferred stock in the 
capital structure of the mining industry declined to almost 
negligible proportions between 1959 and 1968, thus con­
tinuing a declining importance which stemmed at least from 
the early 1930*s. The petroleum industry continued its 
long-term practice of using only negligible amounts of pre­
ferred stock.
Common Stock and Surplus - Nonferrous Metals Industry; 
The importance of common stock and surplus reflects the 
increasing importance of debt and the decreasing importance 
of preferred in both the mining and petroleum industries. 
Graph 6 and table 3 on page 75 show the common stock and 
surplus to total capitalization ratios for all sectors 
studied.
The fact that the nonferrous metals sector had a 
higher ratio than any other sector, reflected the rela­
tively small use of debt until 1964. The common stock and 
surplus to total capitalization ratio was 87.2 percent in 
1959; following 1959> the ratio declined irregularly to 
78.9 percent in 1968. This irregularity is somewhat incon­
sistent with the fairly smooth trends seen between 1929 and 
1958. The definite decline in ratio between 1959 and 1968
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indicates both the declining importance of preferred stock 
and the increasing use of debt during this period.
Common Stock and Surplus - Coal and Iron Industries;
The common stock and surplus ratio for coal also showed a 
marked decline between 1959 and 1966. This declining trend 
is opposite to the generally increasing ratio trend seen 
for coal between 1932 and 1958. The decreased importance 
of common stock financing beginning in 1963 was caused by 
a greater use of debt between 1963 and 1966. The common 
stock and surplus to total capitalization ratio for coal 
was 81.5 percent in 1959 and 72.0 percent in 1966.
The common stock and surplus ratio for the iron-mining 
sector was very irregular between 1959 and 1968. This 
irregularity was caused by the sudden use of large amounts 
of debt, as explained previously, and by the declining 
importance of preferred stock. No definite conclusion may 
be drawn from the iron-mining sector except that both its 
common stock and surplus ratio and its funded debt ratio 
are highly cyclical and irregular.
Common Stock and Surplus - Petroleum Industry: The
common stock and surplus to total capitalization ratio for 
the petroleum industry definitely declined from 1959 to 1968. 
It may be recalled that the same ratio varied fairly con­
sistently between 80 and 87 percent from 1929 to 1958, but 
with little definite, long-term trend. Beginning in 1959,
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when the ratio was 87.1 percent, the petroleum industry 
ratio declined steadily to 79*2 percent in 1968. This 
declining trend directly reflects the increased use of debt 
financing in the capital structure of the industry during 
the period.
The comparison between the mining and petroleum indus­
tries* common stock and surplus ratio is fairly clear. As 
shown on graph 6, the mining industry ratio declines 
irregularly from 83.1 percent in 1959 to 80.7 percent in 
1968. The petroleum industry ratio is higher for almost 
the entire period, being 87.1 percent in 1959 and 79*2 per­
cent in 1968. However, the lower mining ratios reflect a 
greater use of preferred stock in mining than in petroleum, 
not a greater use of debt. Only in the last five years of 
the survey did the mining industry use an amount of debt 
comparable to that used in petroleum.
One of the purposes of this study was to determine the 
recent capital structure of the mining industry. With the 
data in tables 1, 2, and 3, this determination can now be 
made. The average structure for the 1959-1963 period, the 
1964-1968 period, and for 1968 are presented in Exhibit 4 
for all sectors examined in this study.
Summary: Between 1959 and 1968, both the mining and
petroleum industries increased their use of debt financing. 
The increased use was most noticeable in the mining
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Exhibit 4 
Recent Capital Structures in the 







1) funded debt/total capitalization 6.6* 12.4* 20.9?
2) preferred stock/total capitali­
zation 5.5* 1.6* 0.2*
3) common stock & surplus/total 
capitalization 87.9% 86.0* 78.9*
Coal industry:
1) funded debt/total capitalization
2) preferred stock/total capitali­
zation









1) funded debt/total capitalization 5.0* 11.5* 11.2*
2) preferred stock/total capitali­
zation 13.2* 8.9* 6.2*
3) common stock & surplus/total 
capitalization 81.8* 79.6* 82.6*
Mining industry composite:
1) funded debt/total capitalization 10.1* 15.2* 16.1*
2) preferred stock/total capitali­
zation 6.6* 4.1* 3.2*
3) common stock & surplus/total 






1) funded debt/total capitalization 12.955 16.355 20.8?
2) preferred stock/total capitali­
zation 0.055 0.1455 0.1?
3) common stock & surplus/total 
capitalization 87.1% 83.56:5 79.2%
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industry, where funded debt increased to proportions com­
parable to that found in the petroleum industry. The use of 
preferred stock declined to almost negligible proportions 
from 1959 to 1968 in the mining industry. The petroleum 
industry continued to use little, if any, preferred stock 
in its capital structure. The fact that the proportion of 
the capital structure represented by common stock and sur­
plus declined in both industries reflects the increased use 
of debt financing.
Comments on the Depletion Allowance
One of the original goals of this thesis was to examine 
the effect of depletion allowances as a funding instrument 
in the mining and petroleum industries. This original goal 
became impossible to attain due to the lack of meaningful, 
publicized information concerning actual depletion allowance 
claimed and due to the refusal of most of the companies 
studied to provide the necessary data. The author has found 
very little in the literature concerning the actual effect 
of depletion allowance funding. A short explanation of the 
intended study is provided below, followed by an examination 
of the reasons why the study could not be completed. Data 
from the three companies which did provide information is 
also examined.
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A great deal of financial data were gathered by the 
author during the examination of the capital structure of 
the industry. These data were to be used to determine what 
portion of new gross internal funds and of new total funds 
were composed of depletion allowances. The 18 companies 
used in the capital structure study were to be examined for 
the period 1959 to 1968. Ratios were to be used to show 
the relationship between depletion allowances and other 
sources of new funds.
The ultimate question to be answered was, "How important 
are depletion allowance funds to the American mining and 
petroleum industries?” Have such funds increased or decreased 
in importance over the past 10 years? The answers to these 
questions would be most interesting, since there has been 
considerable discussion in the political and economic sec­
tors over the subject of depletion.
Problems Encountered: Close examination of the finan­
cial data available from the published annual reports of 
the 18 companies, from Moody1s Industrial Manuala and from 
other sources demonstrated that little useful information 
could be obtained from these public sources. In many cases, 
depletion, depreciation, and amortization claimed for any 
one tax year were lumped together into one gross figure.
Some companies provided no explicit figures for these non­
cash expenses, but combined them in their reports under
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"other expenses." Pour companies did show separate deple­
tion figures.
However, in all cases where any depletion figures were 
shown at all, whether combined or separate, the notes to the 
financial statements pointed out that the figures shown for 
depletion and depreciation had no relation to the amounts 
actually claimed for tax purposes for these two non-cash 
expenses. The reason for this discrepancy lies in the 
accounting practices common in the United States today. It 
is very common to use one method of accounting for tax pur­
poses, another for publicized information, and still a third 
for internal purposes. This practice is perfectly legal and 
acceptable and is of great use to business. The practice 
does, however, make extraction of many useful and exact 
details from publicized statements very difficult or impos­
sible .
For tax purposes, most companies use the percentage 
depletion calculations previously described to claim deple­
tion allowances. The funds "received" from this tax 
deduction are the critical figures needed to study the 
effect of depletion as a financing instrument. Most com­
panies, in their published statements, use a cost depletion 
figure which has little, if any, relation to the allowance 
claimed on tax returns. These cost depletion figures have 
as a depletable base the value of company ore bodies as
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determined at some point in the past* In many cases, this 
point is March 1, 1913. In other cases, the depletable base 
is the value of the ore body as stated in engineering reports 
during the exploration stage.
Whatever the depletable base may be, the amount shown on 
the published financial statements has no relation to the 
depletion amount claimed for tax purposes. The published 
statements show depletion as exactly analagous to straight- 
line depreciation. The depletable base is "depreciated” by 
an amount directly proportional to the production from the 
ore body. In most cases, the "depreciation” is on a per- 
unit basis.
The results of this "depreciation" process is that many 
companies show orebodies which they are now mining as being 
fully "depreciated.” The Homestake orebody in Lead, South 
Dakota, the major source of the company's income today, was 
fully "depreciated” in 1936. The company has shown no 
depletion in its published reports since that year. However, 
Homestake has received a percentage depletion allowance on 
its tax return for every year since it began mining.
Other companies are using as depletable bases ore body 
values which are considerably lower than the actual value. 
These depletable bases were determined years ago, sometimes 
as early as 1913, using current metal prices and known 
technology. Obviously, a large, low-grade porphyry copper
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body with an average grade of, say, 0.8 percent was nearly 
worthless in 1913* but such is not the case today.
The result of the discrepancy between publicized deple­
tion allowances and the actual allowance received for tax 
purposes is that the publicized figures are totally useless 
in determining the effect of depletion funds. The only way 
to obtain the necessary information was to contact the 
companies themselves. Letters were sent to the appropriate 
vice-presidents of all 18 companies. The letters were care­
fully written so as to assure the companies that the data 
they provided would be used objectively and responsibly. 
Complete secrecy was assured. The figures would be pub­
lished only as industry averages.
Despite these assurances, only three of the 18 companies 
agreed to provide the information requested concerning 
actual depletion funds "received.11 The excuses for the 
refusals were varied, but they all added up to !litfs none 
of your business.11 Six of the companies did not answer 
the inquiry.
The reasons for refusal are a subject for conjecture.
One may assume that the companies would not hesitate to 
release any data which would aid them in their struggle for 
good public relations or in their struggle against the anti­
depletion political forces. One must therefore conclude 
that the refusal to release data on actual depletion
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allowances received would be damaging to the companies 
involved.
Earlier in this study, the point was made that the 
mining and petroleum industries are continually claiming 
that percentage depletion, as now computed, is fair and 
just in view of the risks and large amounts of capital 
required in the natural resource sector. Tax considera­
tion is absolutely necessary to encourage investors to 
expose their capital to high risk. Yet very little quan­
titative data is ever provided with which to support these 
claims.
The refusal of at least some industry representatives 
to provide meaningful, quantitative data regarding deple­
tion funds is an indication that perhaps the mining and 
petroleum industries may not be able to support, in an 
objective, quantitative, their claims in favor of the pres­
ent depletion system. If industry spokesmen are being 
entirely honest and sincere in their statements in support 
percentage depletion, it would seem that they should have 
no hesitation in providing data for an objective, respon­
sible study which might support their arguments. There are, 
however, bther explanations of this reluctance.
One is that while depletion allowances are intended to 
compensate the industry as a whole for its investments in 
mineral and petroleum exploration, this compensation goes
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only to those companies having profitable operations* Those
which do not have profitable reservoirs or ore deposits in
r
production receive nothing, regardless of what they may 
find, while those that do receive compensation which may be 
greatly in excess of their actual costs. This information, 
if released for a study which is concerned only with com­
panies that are successful, could easily be misinterpreted, 
to the detriment of the whole industry.
Another reason may lie in the inherent conservatism of 
those in managerial positions and their reluctance to 
release any information not clearly required by law or 
company policy.
Still another may be that the information is not readily 
available and the expense of collecting it, or the necessary 
time, precludes its being sent.
However, whatever the actual reason, one is left with 
the strong suspicion that the factual data would not sup­
port the claims of the mining and petroleum companies 
regarding percentage depletion.
Responses to the Survey; Three of the 18 companies 
surveyed provided data on the exact amounts claimed between 
1959 and 1968 for depletion and depreciation. All three 
companies requested that their names not be used and that 
the exact figures not be published. Therefore, these 
companies will be referred to as A, B, and C. All three
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companies were nonferrous metals producers; responses from 
the petroleum, iron, and coal sectors were either negative 
or were not received. One of the companies which did pro­
vide information, company B, did not separate the depletion 
and depreciation data. Only two companies of the original 
18, therefore, provided the necessary details on depletion 
claimed.
The lack of data prevents the drawing of meaningful 
conclusions about the four sectors studied. The information 
as intended in the original study are presented for the two 
companies which did provide usable data. These calculations 
are meant to provide only an indication of the effect of 
depletion funds in mine financing and should not be con­
strued to represent the industry in general.
Definition of terms: Three ratios were computed to show
the importance of depletion funds for given periods of time:
1) net internal funds generated 
net total funds generated
2) total depletion allowances received 
net internal funds generated
3) total depletion allowances received . 
net total funds generated
Net internal funds include all funds generated during a
given period through internal sources less all outflows of
internal funds. Net total funds received include all
internal and external funds generated less any outflows of
funds. Total depletion allowances include all funds
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claimed for tax purposes. It must be remembered that all 
funds shown are net of outflows. Outflow of funds might 
occur through transactions such as the retirement of a debt 
issue, the retirement of a preferred stock issue, or a loss 
sustained in a given period which reduced retained earn­
ings .
Four time periods were used in this study: 1959 through
1961; 1962 through 1964; 1965 through 1968; and 1968. These 
periods were chosen so as to provide short enough periods 
within the scope of the study (1959-1968) in which to 
demonstrate trends over time. The periods also had to be 
long enough so that distortions in any one year could be 
averaged and smoothed out with the other years. The one- 
year study of 1968 was done to examine whether any gross 
differences existed between one year and a somewhat longer 
period.
The total funds generated during the periods studied 
were calculated by taking the difference between balance 
sheet data at the beginning and at the end of the period.
For instance, a positive difference between retained earn­
ings for the beginning and end of a period would indicate 
a retension of funds generated through profits. A negative 
difference between bonds outstanding at the beginning and 
end of the periods would indicate an outflow of funds to 
retire the bond issue. The depletion and depreciation
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figures for each year, as provided by the three cooperating 
companies, were totalled over each period*
Results of the Study: The results of the study of the
three companies are shown in Exhibit 5 for the three ratios 
computed over the four time periods studied. Only the 
company A and company C ratios show depletion as a separate 
entity. Company B*s data have actual depreciation and 
depletion combined.
It may be seen that depletion funds were extremely 
important sources of funds throughout the 1959-1968 period 
for both company A and company C. Company A received a 
maximum of 81.4 percent of its total net funds from deple­
tion (1959-1961) while the minimum that it received from 
depletion was 10.4 percent. Company C received a maximum 
of 93*5 percent of its total net funds from depletion 
(1962-1964) and a minimum of 16.2 percent (1965-1968). 
Similar high ratios may be seen for depletion as a percent­
age of net internal funds. For the entire 1959-1968 period 
the average ratio of depletion funds to total funds for 
company A was 38.1 percent and for company C was 56.1 per­
cent. For the same period, the average ratio of depletion 
funds to total internal funds for company A was 38.4 per­
cent and for company C was 61.1 percent.
For the entire 1959-1968 period, depletion funds for 
company A were 45.1 percent of the total of depletion and
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Exhibit 5
Depletion as a Percentage of Total Funds 
and of Internal Funds for Three Companies































































COMPANY A COMPANY B 
1959 through 1968 average
COMPANY C
92.2? 91 .855(c) 85.1?
38. k% 57.855(c) • 61.156
38.X? 52.855(e) 56.1?
(a) Ratios higher than 100# obtained because of net out­
flows of debt funds resulting in net outflows of total 
external funds„
(b) Negative ratios obtained because of net outflows of
internal funds. Retained earnings outflows were greater 
than depletion and depreciation inflows.
(c) Company B data combined depreciation and depletion
funds. Therefore all ratios in which depletion funds 
are indicated actually are ratios of combined deprecia­
tion and depletion.
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depreciation. The same percentage for company C was 76.5 
percent.
These data, while not necessarily representative of the 
industry, do indicate that depletion allowances are tre­
mendously important funding instruments for the mining 
industry. The data gathered by the author in this chapter 
conflict with that gathered by the NBEK study (Creamer and 
others, I960) in the 1950*s. The NBER study indicated that 
the mining industry obtained 9 to 10k percent of its funds 
from depletion. The data in this chapter suggest that the 
industry actually may receive 50 percent or more of its 
funding through depletion allowances.
This discrepancy between the two studies may be explained 
by the fact that the NBER study used only published data of 
the SEC and of other government sources. These published 
sources would show only the cost depletion figures which, as 
explained previously, are of little value. A brief examina­
tion of several companies and their published depletion data, 
supported this idea.
Summary: Percentage depletion allowances clearly give
preferential treatment to the natural resource sector. Such 
treatment was intended by Congress to allow natural resource 
companies to recover, tax free, capital invested in natural 
resource assets. The real issue is whether these industries 
receive too much preferential treatment. Are other non-natural 
resource industries being taxed unfairly while the mining and
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petroleum Industries receive huge capital windfalls through 
depletion? Have these two industries managed to falsely 
convince the people and the government of unusual risks and 
of needs for incentives resulting in unfair preferential 
treatment?
Unfortunately these questions go unanswered while both 
pro and con depletion forces stage verbal battles regarding 
the depletion issue. Since it is clear that neither side 
provides concrete data with which to support its arguments, 
and since it is clear that the industry has refused to pro­
vide such data in at least one case, it is doubtful whether 
the argument will ever be won by either side.
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RECENT AND FUTURE TRENDS IN MINS FINANCE
This study has examined past and present practices in 
mine finance. To complete the financial picture, it is 
necessary to study very recent developments in mine finance 
and to point toward future trends in this field. The most 
significant financial developments are in debt financing and 
in government involvement in mining projects. Several 
recent developments have been examined first in this chapter. 
Actual examples are then studied to demonstrate the newest 
techniques in mine finance. Many of the recent financial 
innovations concern extremely large, foreign ventures in 
which American and foreign companies combine to develop 
high-tonnage, long-term, low-grade deposits in all parts of 
the world.
The ABC Transaction
One of the more common financing methods in the petroleum 
industry is the ABC transaction, which is used to transfer a 
property from one party to another while allowing both 
parties maximum tax advantages and minimum investment of 
capital. The name of this financing method is derived from 
the common practice of designating the original owner, and 
seller, of the property as party A, the buyer as party B, 
and an unrelated third party as party C.
106
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For example, party A owns a property worth $2,000,000. 
Party B wishes to purchase the property for this amount, but 
does not want to pay the $2,000,000 in cash. Parties A and 
B agree to an immediate payment of $500,000 by B to A, the 
remaining $1,500,000 to be paid through a production payment 
in the future. A production payment is a payment out of 
future gross proceeds from the property. These production 
payments may extend over several years or over 10 or 15 years; 
therefore, this transaction may be considered as intermediate 
to long-term financing. Party B would pay A an interest rate 
of, say, 5 3/4 percent for this "loan" of $1,500,000. Party 
A then sells the production payment to a third party, C,
Party C may be an insurance company,, a group of individuals, 
or another company wishing to invest funds. Party C finances 
the $1,500,000 with a commercial bank loan at an interest 
rate of, say, 5 1/2 percent. The result of this transaction 
is that C will receive the* full $1,500,000 production payment 
plus 5 3/4 percent interest in the future. Party C!s profit 
will be the spread between the 5 3/4 percent interest he 
receives and the 5 1/2 percent interest he pays on his bank 
loan. Party C secures the bank loan with a mortgage on the 
production payment.
Party A has received his full $2,000,000 at the time of 
sale of the property. Party B has acquired the title to the 
property and must pay only the production payment out of 
gross income for a limited number of years in the future.
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If the agreement is properly arranged, the production payment 
will be large enough to leave B with only enough revenue to 
cover operating and depreciation costs. Party B will incur 
no taxes for the period of the production payment and will 
be able to repay the "loan” from before-tax revenues. Had 
party B paid cash for the property, he would have to recover 
his investment from after-tax revenues, since he would have 
used retained earnings (an after-tax source of funds) to pay 
for the property, Party B may acquire the mineral property 
by outright purchase, but, in doing this, B will tie up 
substantial amounts of capital which would be recoverable 
only through cost depletion. Since, in most cases, percent­
age depletion is greater than cost depletion, it is usually 
advantageous to keep capitalized costs as low as possible.
The ABC transaction has been developed to enable the pur­
chaser of mineral property to capitalize as little of the 
purchase price as possible. It must be stressed that this 
transaction depends entirely upon tax legislation; changes 
in the present tax structure may eliminate the advantages of 
this financing method.
Little use has been made of this method in the mining 
industry, although there appear to be no unusual restric­
tions or reasons for this lack of use. Since the mid-1950*s, 
many court cases have developed precedents and definitions 
of terms and concepts. The use of the transaction in the 
mining industry apparently awaits only the recognition of
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its merits by the industry and the agressiveness of the 
banking sector. It appears that the ABC transaction may 
play a major role in mine finance in the future barring 
unforseen changes in present tax legislation. Although no 
exact data are available, there is evidence that, after 
1965, the ABC transaction gained some followers in mining.
The petroleum industry has used this method extensively.
A recent study demonstrated that, at the end of 1959* 12 
major banks had outstanding petroleum and natural gas pro­
duction payment loans of $392 million. In 1963, the same 
12 banks reported $1,147 billion in such loans (Cummings, 
1965, p. 64).
Carved-Qut Production Payments
A financing method similar to the ABC transaction is 
the carved-out production payment which might be considered 
an nACM transaction. The carved-out production payment is 
used to maximize depletion allowances and to finance develop­
ment work. Once again, the petroleum industry has used this 
method extensively, while the mining industry has not yet 
tapped this source of capital to any degree. This lack of 
interest by the mining industry may reflect less need to 
maximize depletion allowances with these techniques or a 
lack of agressiveness on the part of the banking sector.
The first major type of carved-out production payment 
is designed to maximize depletion allowances. It may be
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shown that the net gain from percentage depletion is maxim­
ized if the percentage depletion allowance is identical with 
the limitation of 50 percent of net income before depletion 
and taxes (Cummings, 1965, p. 65). If a company has high, 
non-recurrable expenses in any one year, it may be subject 
to the 50-percent limitation and may therefore lose some of 
the benefit of the percentage depletion allowance. If it 
can increase its income without increasing expenses, the 50- 
percent limitation will be overcome.
Tax courts have ruled that the sale of a carved-out pro­
duction payment is an advance sale of production and is tax­
able income. Party A, the owner of a producing property, 
may sell a production payment to party C, an unrelated third 
party. Party C will finance the transaction with a bank loan 
secured by the production payment. The income generated for 
A through this transaction is taxable income which will 
raise his 50-percent limit on claimable depletion. There­
fore, A will maximize the benefit from percentage depletion 
by obtaining such debt financing. The period over which the 
production payments are to be made may cause this financing 
to be intermediate or long term. It must be stated that the 
use of such a technique depends entirely upon the individual 
case. The current use of ”future” income will deprive 
future periods of income and may cause problems concerning 
the 50-percent limit at that time.
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A second type of carved-out production payment may be 
used for development work. The owner of a mining property,
A, may sell a production payment to a third party, C.
Proceeds from the sale are not taxable if they are used to 
carry on development work. This type of transaction has 
been used recently in foreign ventures and will be illustrated 
later. Domestic use of this type of carved-out production 
payment has increased in the last few years (Wilson, 1968, 
p. 128).
The purpose of both major types of production payment 
is to obtain capital and to repay the principle out of 
before-tax income. Naturally, production from the property 
in question must be assured for either the ABC or the ’'AC" 
transaction to be a safe venture for either A or C,
Conventional Financial Institution Loans
It was pointed out in previous chapters that the use of 
debt financing in the mining industry has been on the 
increase since at least the early 1960fs and probably since 
about 1952. The reasons for this trend are not difficult 
to understand. The economic picture has improved consider­
ably since the Depression and WW II periods. This improving 
outlook has encouraged many mining companies to expose 
themselves to the risk of debt financing so as to obtain 
lower cost capital. The efficiency of the American money 
and capital markets has also improved, enabling investors
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and borrowers with special needs to obtain the necessary 
type of financing. Undoubtedly, the sophistication of those 
charged with the financial responsibility throughout the 
business sector has increased. A combination of the above 
factors has improved the image of the mining industry and 
has made the investment sector more willing to provide debt 
financing for the mining industry. In periods of at least 
mild inflation, such as have been experienced in the last 20 
years, the use of debt financing is particularly attractive 
to borrowers. The fixed interest and principle become 
lighter burdens for the borrower, since inflation makes 
repayment of debt "cheaper” as time goes by.
The major forms of debt financing currently used in the 
mining industry have been conventional bond issues and bank 
loans rather than the specialized debt instruments described 
previously in this chapter. Since 1963, mineral producers 
have made increasing use of commercial bank term-loans to 
finance surface and underground facilities, excavating 
machinery, rolling stock, ore processing facilities, and 
other tangible equipment (Wilson, 1968, p. 127). Most of 
these loans have been intermediate-term, three to eight 
years, and do not strictly come under the definition of 
long-term capital used in this thesis. Nearly all loans are 
secured by mortgages on the equipment purchased. Although 
a great deal more bank financing has been used in the
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petroleum industry than in mining, the future definitely 
will see more use of bank credit by the mining industry.
Loan policies used in petroleum financing will have to 
be altered to accommodate the special conditions found in 
mining. According to Wilson (1968, p. 127)> determination 
of reserves in place is easier in mining than in petroleum, 
while determination of recoverable economic reserves and 
cash flows are more difficult in mining, since mining pro­
fit margins are much lower than are petroleum margins (5 to 
25 percent versus 50 percent). Mineral prices fluctuate 
more than petroleum prices. Mines are more risky investments 
due to the danger of such disasters as cave-ins. However, 
mines generally do not decline in production with time as 
quickly as do oil wells.
This chapter now concludes with examples of these 
trends in long-term, debt financing and with an examina­
tion of government assistance in the mining sector.
Consortiums
One of the most significant structural, as well as 
financial, developments in the mining industry in the last 
20 years has been the tendency toward consortiums of large 
mining companies. Exploration and development have become 
so expensive that one company cannot afford either the costs 
or the risks associated with modern-day mining. This 
tendency is particularly true on the international scene
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where risks associated with uncertain political conditions 
and costs of development have been extremely high* The 
several large iron developments in Australia are excellent 
examples of this trend to consortiums - Hamersley (Conzinc 
Rio Tinto and Kaiser Steel) and Mount Newman (Amax and 
Colonial Sugar Refining Co.). The Southern Peru Copper 
Corp. composed of ASARCO, Cerro, Phelps Dodge , and Newmont 
is a Latin American example. Palabora, in South Africa, was 
originally owned by Newmont, Amax, Union Carbide, Selection 
Trust, Rio Tinto, and several other smaller interests.
The development of consortiums not only assures each 
participant of lower risk than encountered in a solo venture, 
but also assures the project of adequate financing. Most of 
these large consortiums have relied upon huge amounts of 
debt financing and have acquired this financing through the 
sound financial status and credit-worthiness of the partners. 
Most ventures of this type have required not only explora­
tion and mine development work but also construction of 
harbors, railway facilities, towns, and other extremely 
expensive undertakings. Undoubtedly, one of the major 
reasons for the recent large use of debt in international 
ventures has been the development of consortiums.
Debt Financing of Large Ventures
The projects which have brought consortiums to the fore­
front of modern mining have been very large users of capital.
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Palabora required over $100 million, Mount Goldsworthy over 
$106 million, Hamersley over $170 million, and Mount Newman 
over $125 million (MacWilliam, 1966, p. 39). A large por­
tion of these requirements has been met through debt 
financing. It is absolutely necessary that the^g^rpject 
be well planned and that all financing needs be arranged 
before the project is begun. Generally, lenders will 
require that the borrower invest a large amount of money in 
the project before loan money is made available.
The development of the Mesabi Range taconites is an 
excellent example of debt used to finance equipment and 
development. The Reserve Mining Co., owned equally by 
Armco and Republic Steel, spent $8 million proving its 
deposits and undertook to invest an additional $40 million. 
A consortium of insurance companies then provided $148 
million by purchasing a mortgage bond issue for additional 
development expenses (MacWilliams, 1966, p. 40). Canadian 
banks frequently provide similar financing, as well as 
equity financing, as in the case of Consolidated Denison 
Mines.
The sale of production payments to metal-consuming r 
companies promises to be a very important source of debt 
financing in the years ahead. The purchasers of these pro­
duction payments have a genuine interest in the success of 
the venture and would probably be more accommodating.in the 
event of unexpected financial trouble. Such arrangements
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promote a type of financial "vertical integration" and can 
be extremely complex and varied. In the most simple form, 
a metal consumer will provide the producer with loan capital 
and will accept repayment in mine products. Such a case 
was the agreement between Brunswick Mining and Smelting 
Corp. of Canada and Soci^te G€n£rale des Minerals Belgium 
(SGM), where SGM purchased $11,500,000 of 6-percent mortgage 
bonds (MacWilliams, 1966, p. 40).
The negotiation of long-term sales contracts, sometimes 
extending up to 20 years, may provide producers with excel­
lent collateral with which to seek debt financing. The 
Australian iron-ore developments are excellent examples of 
such arrangements. The owners of the Mount Goldsworthy 
project negotiated a 7-year sales contract, worth approxi­
mately $160,000,000, with several Japanese steel mills. 
Development costing nearly $52,000,000 was financed largely 
through debt funds secured by the sales contract. Similar 
arrangements were made by the owners of Hamersley, Palabora, 
and Mount Newman (MacWilliams, 1966, p. 41), Debt financing 
enables producers to use large amounts of relatively cheap 
capital to obtain very favorable leverage on equity funds 
and to maintain complete management control of the project 
with a fairly small equity base.
The financing of Palabora in South Africa, an extremely 
complex arrangement, provides an additional example. Debt
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funds were obtained through loans from German metal con­
sumers; the loans were guaranteed by the German government. 
Loans were obtained from a South African bank, and bonds 
were sold to the sponsoring companies in the project. Pre­
ferred stock was sold to South African insurance companies 
and to a government development corporation. The financing 
of the Savage River project in Tasmania was equally complex 
and involved several major American and Australian producers, 
Japanese steel and trading companies, Australian insurance 
companies, Australian oil companies, and American banks and 
insurance companies. A large amount of debt financing was 
used (Conway, 1969* P« **3).
The trend is very clear. Huge amounts of debt are 
being used increasingly to finance large foreign mining 
ventures which are sponsored by consortiums of many compan­
ies of different nationalities. Not the least important 
development is the practice of including local capital in 
the project even if local interests must borrow these funds 
from the American, British, and other interests. One of the 
major reasons for such large use of debt is the capital 
export restrictions imposed by the British, American, and 
Japanese governments. Because large amounts of equity can­
not be exported from these countries, the participants seek 
loan capital elsewhere. By use of debt financing, control 
over the project can be maintained with a small equity base,
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while large amounts of capital are still available to finance 
the project adequately.
Government Participation
It would be a mistake to ignore the increasing import­
ance of government participation in mine finance. It is 
beyond the scope of this study to examine the effects of 
fiscal policy, monetary policy, tax legislation, and mineral 
and corporate legislation on the world mining industry.
These policies are extremely important. Governments through­
out the world are becoming increasingly important in the 
actual financing of mining ventures.
Perhaps the best example of such government participa­
tion in the United States is the Office of Mineral Explora­
tion (OME) which provides loan capital to worthy explora­
tion projects. The OME is the latest in a series of govern­
ment agencies which provide financial aid to private 
interests and encourage exploration for domestic mineral 
resources. Acceptable private interests may obtain loans 
from OME for exploration work only. If the venture is 
successful, the loan is repaid through a 5-percent royalty 
on production. If the venture is unsuccessful, the loan 
need not be repaid. This program has succeeded in locating 
$11 of economic reserves for every $1 spent by the govern­
ment (personal communication, William Hasler, 1969). Per­
haps the most successful example of this program is the
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Questa project of Molycorp in New Mexico.
Other government agencies have been important in financ­
ing both exploration and development during war periods.
The White Pine project of the Copper Range Co. is perhaps 
the most notable example (MacWilliam, 1966, p. 43). Between 
1952 and 1955, a 5-percent, 20-year loan of $66,000,000 was 
provided by the government and was secured by the fixed 
assets of the mine. A large portion ($47,000,000) of the 
project qualified for accelerated depreciation, 70 percent 
of which could be written off within 5 years. The govern­
ment also agreed, if requested, to purchase 89 percent of 
the first 275,000 tons of copper produced at $0,255 per 
pound or at market price, whichever was higher.
The work of the Bureau of Mines and the Geological 
Survey is of considerable importance. The mapping and 
research work done by these agencies is available almost 
cost-free to anyone in the United States. Although this 
work is not direct financing of the industry, it cannot be 
ignored as an indirect source of long-term funds. The 
government is providing information which would be very 
costly if the industry itself had to finance the work.
Foreign governments provide even more financial aid 
than does the American government. This aid can range from 
complete loan financing of .exploration programs, including 
rental of drills and other equipment as found in Rhodesia, 
to full-scale nationalization. The Canadian Geological
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Survey provides a great deal of geological work to the 
mining industry in a fashion similar to the U.S. Geological 
Survey. The government of Ecuador maintains a large explora­
tion program, including diamond drilling of interesting 
targets, under the control of the Army. Results are 
supplied to private interests.
The issue of nationalization is not always a welcome 
one for the mining industry; but, nevertheless, such 
government policy does provide financing for the industry.
The most conspicuous examples today are the Chilean, Peruv­
ian, and Zambian ventures into the mining industry. Such 
nationalization arises from complex backgrounds and probably 
hurts the country involved in the long run.
More palatable government participation is represented 
by sales contracts similar to those of the White Pine 
project. For instance, the governments of the United States, 
England, and Canada guaranteed success to uranium mines in 
Canada and South Africa through sales contracts. The con­
tracts were then used by the mines involved as collateral 
for loans to finance expensive mine development. Loans 
obtained in such a manner constituted 9.3 percent of the 
total investment in Orange Free State (South Africa) mines 
in 1955 (MacWilliam, 1966, p. 43).
Governments also provide loan or equity financing to 
mining projects through development corporations. These 
corporations generally work as partners with private
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interests and are found in virtually all African countries. 
Similar development corporations are maintained by Great 
Britain and Germany to aid in the industrialization of 
underdeveloped economies.
A good example of a domestic development corpora­
tion, and one which the author observed closely, is the 
Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) of South Africa.
The IDC participates in all areas of industry, but is par­
ticularly interested in developing domestic natural 
resources due to South Africa*s vulnerable political posi­
tion with regard to imports. In early 1970, IDC and Falcon- 
bridge, a Canadian nickel producer, announced a joint copper 
venture in South West Africa involving large amounts of loan 
and equity capital from IDC. The huge Rosh Pinah zinc 
project in South West Africa is also an IDC undertaking, 
where a sub-economic deposit is being exploited to supply 
domestic, private metal consumers with zinc.
An excellent example of an advanced country’s develop­
ment corporation is Great Britain’s Commonwealth Development 
Corporation (GDC), which operates in Britain’s former 
colonies. The CDC is definitely profit motivated and will 
not undertake an uneconomic venture (personal communication, 
John Langton, 1968). At the same time, the CDC is inter­
ested in projects which will benefit underdeveloped 
countries. One example of its participation in a mining 
venture is Kilembe Mines, Ltd., in Uganda. The CDC provided
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a 20-percent equity interest, while Falconbridge provided 
the other 80 percent to develop the large Ugandan copper 
project. The CDC also provided over $2,800,000 in debt 
financing through unsecured loans and debentures. Other 
mining projects in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda have 
benefitted from consortia consisting of CDC, the national 
governments, and the West German equivalent of CDC. Such 
projects frequently are developed by the quasi-government 
organizations such as CDC and are then sold to, participated 
in, or managed by private mining interests.
The United States government operates, or participates 
in, several agencies which provide capital to the mining 
industry for foreign ventures. The Export-Import Bank 
frequently provides loan capital for American-sponsored 
ventures such as the Southern Peru Copper Corp. or guaran­
tees loans to the participants in these ventures. The 
Agency for International Development (AID) is probably the 
closest American agency to CDC. The World Bank, heavily 
supported by the United States government, also provides 
large amounts of loan funds to American mining ventures.
The Compagnie Mini^re de lT0gooud (COMILOG), which operates 
manganese mines in Gabon and is 49 percent owned by U.S. 
Steel, received $35,000,000 in loans in 1964 from the World 
Bank (MacWilliam, 1966, p. 42),
The examples cited above demonstrate the importance of 
government financing in the mining sector. The development
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of such government participation has been fairly recent, 
and there is little doubt that this participation will 
increase in the future. It is important to note that many 
of the companies involved in these government-supported 
ventures are American. Such government support, especially 
in the domestic ventures cited, must be considered an 
important source of long-term financing. The American 
mining industry is more and more frequently moving abroad, 
in selected areas, in its search for minerals. Government- 
supported ventures conserve domestic United States capital 
and provide more safety for these American companies. It 
is extremely significant that most of the capital provided 
through government participation is debt capital which pro­
vides low-cost funds with no loss of control of the project.
A final example of modern trends in mine finance will 
demonstrate nearly all of the recent financial developments 
described in this chapter. Freeport Sulphur Co. and the 
Indonesian government have made final arrangements to develop 
the Ertsberg copper project in West Irian (U.S. News, 1970, 
p. 60), The $120 million project will be financed by 
Freeport and the Indonesian government and by a $100 million 
set of loans from various sources. Japanese and West German 
copper buyers will provide $42 million in loans to be repaid 
with production from the mine. Senior debt financing amount­
ing to $40 million in loans will be provided by American 
insurance companies such as Connecticut General, Equitable,
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Northwestern Mutual, Aetna, and Mutual of New York. These
f
loans will be fully guaranteed by AID, A further $18 
million has been provided by seven United States banks, 
among which are Chase Manhattan, Chemical, Morgan Guaranty 
Trust, and United Virginia/State Planters, These loans have 
also been guaranteed by AID, Freeport is also insured by 
AID against war loss, seizure, or currency unconvertibility.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has examined the financial instruments used 
today to fund American business; the capital structure of 
the mining and petroleum industries from 1929 through 1968; 
the trends in the financing of business ventures since 1900; 
and the depletion question* Several conclusions may be 
inferred from this study*
Capital Structure
It is evident that mining companies are using greater 
amounts of debt financing today than they were in the past* 
This use of cheaper funds will undoubtedly decrease the 
weighted cost of capital for the mining industry and should, 
therefore, cause profits to rise* Since, by almost any 
measure of profits, the mining industry has performed poorly 
in the past, a rise in profits will enhance the position of 
the industry in the business sector* A rise in profits 
should make mining a more attractive investment for non- 
speculative capital, a situation which could cause mining 
stocks to increase in price. The improved profits picture 
will make more cheap capital available to the industry, a 
situation which will enable the industry to spend more time 
and money in developing new mining methods and new machinery, 
and in pursuing other problems through research*
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The greater availability of capital through increased 
profits and the increased effort in research and develop­
ment will enable the industry to improve exploration and 
mining techniques and to remove some of the risk under 
which the industry now works. New and lower grade mineral 
deposits in many parts of the world may then become 
economic propositions. The increased ability of the indus­
try to mine lower grade deposits will benefit everyone 
concerned.
The use of debt financing requires a safe earnings out­
look and a low risk to the lender. It was pointed out that 
large mining companies are the main users of debt due to 
their greater safety in having many sources of income. The 
increased use of debt by all business sectors may encourage 
the formation of large mining companies so as to be able to 
compete with other industrial sectors for scarce funds.
The increase in debt use is, in part, a result of new 
developments in today’s money and capital markets. These 
new developments are providing new sources of financing to 
American industry. American mining must be able to compete 
for these funds in order to keep pace with other industries. 
Raw materials must be provided to today’s expanding econ­
omy. If today’s mining companies are to provide these 
materials, they must be able to compete for funds. Part of 
the solution in this competition is size. Today’s mining
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companies may grow "naturally" or through merger, but they 
must grow.
Closely allied with the need and the tendency to grow 
is the direction of this growth. Part of the solution in 
the competition for capital is size; another part is an 
assured future income. It was pointed out in a previous 
chapter that one reason the coal industry has, historically, 
used great amounts of debt financing is long-term sales 
contracts. Such contracts insure future earnings with which 
to repay debt. Earnings may also be made more reliable 
through vertical integration. Such integration decreases 
the risk of selling products produced by a given company. 
Just as large steel companies have reduced their risk of 
supply of iron ore by integrating back to the mine, today's 
base metal producers and other mining sectors will integrate 
forward to assure themselves of markets for their products. 
This trend is already obvious. For example, both Anaconda 
and Kennecott own large fabricating subsidiaries. U.S. 
Smelting recently purchased such a subsidiary.
Where this forward integration will end is difficult to 
surmise. The petroleum industry has gone the entire course 
from raw producer to retailer. The mining industry will 
encounter large interests as it integrates forward in the 
form of the consumers of its products. It may then become 
a question of who will swallow whom in the merger game.
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The increased use of debt will prompt the money and 
capital markets to devise new financing methods with which 
to cope with mining1s unique problems. Such methods as the 
ABC transaction will be developed to provide adequate 
financing, efficient use of scarce capital, and maximum tax 
advantages. This situation will increase the efficiency of 
the capitalistic system to the benefit of all.
Depletion
Little can be said in the area of depletion due to the 
lack of adequate data. It appears that, historically, the 
present system of percentage depletion was arbitrary and 
had little factual base. One of the advantages of the present 
system is its simplicity compared with the pre-1926 methods 
of computing depletion. For this reason alone, the present 
method should probably be maintained. Also, over the years, 
many court cases and other legal and tax work have refined, 
defined, and established procedures understood by all 
persons involved in the depletion area. Such work is val­
uable and should be carefully considered before major
alterations are made which would require equally long 
periods of definition and refinement.
However, one cannot help but be concerned over the
arbitrary nature of the percentages used in the present tax
legislation. The major conclusion of this study with 
regard to depletion is that more information is necessary
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so as to determine exactly what effect today’s practices 
cause. Are the recent percentage reductions justified?
Is the industry being hurt by such reductions? Or is the 
industry already receiving more than its share of tax 
relief? The information is simply not available with which 
to answer these and other questions. Because the informa­
tion is not available, arbitrary percentage reductions in 
the political arena, such as the 1969 tax reform, may 
seriously injure the industry. On the other hand, if 
today’s percentages are too high, the economic efficiency 
of our system may be harmed by the diversion of scarce 
funds into a sector of less than average profitability.
A thorough study should be undertaken by the Internal 
Revenue Service or by some other comparable body so as to 
provide objective, reliable information around which to 
develop American tax legislation. Companies should be 
forced to divulge the necessary information. The study 
should be completely apolitical and should be under the 
direction of a highly competent and neutral body.
The small amount of data available for two companies on 
actual depletion allowance received indicates that deple­
tion is an extremely important financing instrument for the 
industry. This small amount of data make the question, MHow 
important is depletion for the mining and petroleum 
industries?” a most intriguing one - one which should be
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